Titlebook: Corporate Governance in Germany; An Empirical Investi Jens Köke Book 2002 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg 2002 Acquisition.Germany.Governance.Own

Agitated

书目名称Corporate Governance in Germany影响因子(影响力)




书目名称Corporate Governance in Germany影响因子(影响力)学科排名




书目名称Corporate Governance in Germany网络公开度




书目名称Corporate Governance in Germany网络公开度学科排名




书目名称Corporate Governance in Germany被引频次




书目名称Corporate Governance in Germany被引频次学科排名




书目名称Corporate Governance in Germany年度引用




书目名称Corporate Governance in Germany年度引用学科排名




书目名称Corporate Governance in Germany读者反馈




书目名称Corporate Governance in Germany读者反馈学科排名

四溢

Literature Review and Methodological Concerns,o point out important methodological problems constraining these studies. It also suggests solutions to these problems, paying particular attention to the institutional setting in Germany. The ultimate aim is to indicate which data should be collected for corporate governance analyses and which meth

BROW

Frequency, Causes, and Consequences of Control Transfers,ue that such a market for corporate control is an important element of corporate governance. Particularly active markets have been described for the US (e.g., Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jarrell et al., 1988) and the UK (Franks and Mayer, 1990). To a large extent these markets are based on hostile take

Meditative

Determinants of Acquisition and Failure,issues have recently attracted the increased attention of researchers and policy makers alike. In Germany, but also in other continental European countries the number of insolvencies continued to rise or stagnated at high levels. At the same time, in the past decade we have seen an upsurge in merger

indices

fiscal

Concluding Remarks,rporate governance analysis in Germany (Chapter 3). Compared with previously available data sets, GCD is less likely to suffer from selectivity bias because it includes listed and non-listed corporations, private as well as public. In addition, GCD allows to avoid common methodological drawbacks of

fiscal

Alaa El Din Mahmoud,Manal Fawzyporate governance and ultimately spur productivity growth, as argued by Borsch-Supan and Winter (1999). Hence, good corporate governance could help reduce the transition burden associated with a change in the pension scheme.

Conserve

Corporate Governance, Market Discipline, And Productivity Growth,porate governance and ultimately spur productivity growth, as argued by Borsch-Supan and Winter (1999). Hence, good corporate governance could help reduce the transition burden associated with a change in the pension scheme.

PATHY

设想

Concluding Remarks,previous studies such as endogeneity or missing variables because it is a large unbalanced panel and because it contains a much richer set of information on all relevant corporate governance mechanisms.