Titlebook: Contracts of Adhesion Between Law and Economics; Rethinking the Uncon Elena D‘Agostino Book 2015 The Author(s) 2015 Competitive market.Cons

Pruritus

Market Structure,We reject the market structure hypothesis, as theorized by Kessler (1943), who argued that the risk of unfair clauses is very high especially in those markets in which sellers have market power, above all in the case of a monopoly. By contrast, we prove that unfair clauses are ubiquitous across market structures.

APEX

Lack of Sophistication,We now relax the assumption of consumer sophistication and include (some) naive consumers in the analysis, defined as those consumers who do not care about clauses in fine print or simply do not realize the presence of these clauses, and therefore do not read.

Aboveboard

Public Intervention,We now analyze how legal systems have addressed the problems related to the usage of contracts of adhesion. In particular, we will compare a common law system, such as the US system, with a civil law system, such as the German system. We will also analyze how the latter has influenced the EU legislation culminating in Directive 93/13/EEC.

咽下

HACK

Concluding Remarks,to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and consumers can verify the contract . by reading clauses at some positive cost. We have analyzed the unconscionability doctrine, as traditionally applied to contracts of adhesion, and have criticized its main criteria: market structure, lack of sophistication, and contract complexity.

合唱团

Elena D‘AgostinoModels contract complexity in the easiest possible way.Analyzes theory and practice in relation to standard form contracts.Explores how legal systems can be used to protect customers from fine prints

Contort

动作谜

Contracts of Adhesion Between Law and Economics978-3-319-13114-6Series ISSN 2192-855X Series E-ISSN 2192-8568

饥荒

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69967-5 enough a monopolist is more likely to disclose (and therefore to offer efficient friendly clauses) than competitive sellers. By contrast, if enough consumers are naïve, then disclosure takes place only in a competitive market.

uveitis

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70872-8to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and consumers can verify the contract . by reading clauses at some positive cost. We have analyzed the unconscionability doctrine, as traditionally applied to contracts of adhesion, and have criticized its main criteria: market structure, lack of sophistication, and contract complexity.