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Titlebook: Conflict and Governance; Amihai Glazer,Kai A. Konrad Book 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003 Conflict.Crime.Ethnic conflict.Polit

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发表于 2025-3-21 19:56:56 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
书目名称Conflict and Governance
编辑Amihai Glazer,Kai A. Konrad
视频video
概述State-of-the-art applications of economic theory to issues of conflict.Studies of crime, dictatorship, and revolutions with interesting historical material.Includes supplementary material:
图书封面Titlebook: Conflict and Governance;  Amihai Glazer,Kai A. Konrad Book 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003 Conflict.Crime.Ethnic conflict.Polit
描述Economists and political scientists have recently begun to study formally how conftict and the possibility of conftict affects resource allocation and economic performance.! For example, an extensive empiricalliterature suggests that conftict and political instability adversely affects economic development and that higher 2 inequality causes poor economic performance by inducing increased conftict. In this paper I argue that a serious ftaw in this research has taken too individu­ 3 alistic a view of conftict. While the approach of methodological individualism is attractive, in reality individuals act not purely in isolation, but also as part of larger social groupings and networks. I therefore try to consider how these models of conftict may be extended to this type of situation and thus attempt to place individuals within a larger social setting to see how this alters our intuitions about conftict and its economic and political determinants and implications. But what groups are relevant? Individuals belong to many overlapping and cross cutting groups in society. While traditional Marxist analysis stressed dass groupings so that workers associated with workers and capitalists with
出版日期Book 2003
关键词Conflict; Crime; Ethnic conflict; Political Economy; Revolution; Terror; Theory of Conflict; War
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-05121-4
isbn_softcover978-3-642-05527-0
isbn_ebook978-3-662-05121-4
copyrightSpringer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003
The information of publication is updating

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Book 2003 economic performance.! For example, an extensive empiricalliterature suggests that conftict and political instability adversely affects economic development and that higher 2 inequality causes poor economic performance by inducing increased conftict. In this paper I argue that a serious ftaw in thi
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