Titlebook: Competing Interest Groups and Lobbying in the Construction of the European Banking Union; Giuseppe Montalbano Book 2021 The Editor(s) (if

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熔岩

A Critical Transnationalist Approach to the European Financial Governancebbying. First, it offers a review of the literature on the EU post-crisis financial regulation and corporate influence, discussing its merits and shortcomings. A critical transnationalist approach is thus outlined, built on the Neo-Gramscian literature. Structure and agency both shape the emergence

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情节剧

The Crisis Management Framework and the Single Resolution Mechanism of the Single Resolution Mechanism and Fund. Contrary to the Banking Union’s initial project, it soon appeared clear that the Single Supervisory Mechanism would not represent the very premise for a common backstop and burden-sharing arrangement capable of reaching the ambitious aim to break the ban

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杀死

The Reform of the Prudential Framework and the Single Rule Books underpinning the Banking Union, from the Regulation and Directive on capital requirements (CRR and CRD IV), up to their recent revisions under the “Banking Package.” The European banking industry united the efforts to water down the introduction of harsher rules, framing their opposition by pointi

gerrymander

Myosin

Conclusionscess. The overall regulatory and institutional architecture here scrutinized reflects a mediation between the core demands of European transnational banks and the German/Northern bloc of domestic banks. Rather than being severed, the Banking Union reshaped the bank-State doom loop. The EU post-crisi

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