| 期刊全称 | Breach of Contract | | 期刊简称 | An Economic Analysis | | 影响因子2023 | Oliver Hofmann | | 视频video | | | 发行地址 | Offers a comprehensive analysis of the efficient breach scenario.Explains the impact of asymmetric information, market structure and behavioral economics on the effects of different remedies for breac | | 学科分类 | International Law and Economics | | 图书封面 |  | | 影响因子 | “Efficient breach” is one of the most discussed topics in the literature of law and economics. What remedy incentivizes the parties of a contract to perform contracts if and only if it is efficient? This book provides a new perception based on an in-depth analysis of the impact the market structure, asymmetry of information, and deviations from the rational choice model have, comprehensively. .The author compares the two predominant remedies for breach of contract which have been adopted by most jurisdictions and also found access to international conventions like the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CiSG): Specific performance and expectation damages. The book illustrates the complexity such a comparison has under more realistic assumptions. The author shows that no simple answer is possible, but one needs to account for the circumstances. The comparison takes an economic approach to law applying game theory. The game-theoretic models are consistent throughout the entire book which makes it easy for the reader to understand what effects different assumptions about the market structure, the distribution of information, and deviations from the rational ch | | Pindex | Book 2021 |
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发表于 2025-3-21 19:38:24
