Titlebook: Attacks and Defenses for the Internet-of-Things; 5th International Wo Wenjuan Li,Steven Furnell,Weizhi Meng Conference proceedings 2022 The

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Attacks and Defenses for the Internet-of-Things978-3-031-21311-3Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349

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骄傲

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21311-3malware and unwanted software; IoT security and privacy; IoT forensic techniques; usable security and p

短程旅游

978-3-031-21310-6The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerl

使坚硬

Donovan Stanberry,Lystra Fletcher-Paultitute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We evaluate the speed and code size of various software implementations on five different platforms featuring four different architectures. Moreover, we benchmark the dynamic memory utilization of the remaining NIST LWC algorithms on one 32-bit ARM controll

aerial

William A. Mcintosh,Marissa Cisneros performance, masking their implementations results in a huge penalty. Since efficient protection against side-channel attacks is a requirement in lots of use cases, we focus on optimizing the Boolean masking of the modular addition. Contrary to recent related work, we target evolving a masked full

AVERT

William A. Mcintosh,Marissa Cisnerosble performance in detecting attacks. However, the lack of transparency in their decision-making process and the scarcity of attack data for training purposes pose a major challenge for the development of ML-based IDS systems for Internet of Things (IoT). Therefore, employing anomaly detection metho

HUMID

William A. Mcintosh,Marissa Cisnerosnerated invalid signatures in the case an aggregate signature is detected as invalid. In existing FT-AS schemes (whose tracing functionality requires multi-rounds), a verifier needs to send a feedback to an aggregator for efficiently tracing the invalid signer(s). However, in practice, if this feedb

CULP

William A. Mcintosh,Marissa Cisneros crucial. Authenticated key exchange protocols establish shared cryptographic keys between the parties and, in addition, authenticate their identities. Usually, the identities are based on a pair of private and public keys. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are widely used recently to bind physic

FRONT

William A. Mcintosh,Marissa Cisnerose profiling for the purpose of authentication, localization, and physical security perimeter monitoring. Previous research on the use of RSSI-based wireless node profiling assumes that RSSI timeseries are stationary and independent identically distributed (i.i.d.). Unfortunately, in real-world envir