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Titlebook: Applied Game Theory; Proceedings of a Con S. J. Brams,A. Schotter,G. Schwödiauer Conference proceedings 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelb

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An Approach to the Problem of Efficient Distribution of the Labor Forceeoretic considerations. More specifically, the only active market in our models is the labor market, and we determine and investigate its Nash equilibrium points. The models vary in the degree of influence that government has in determining the wage of public servants. It should be emphasized that i
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On Entry Preventing Behavior and Limit Price Models of Entrymand and cost functions, and throughout the paper, noncooperative behavior is assumed. The model has two distinct stages: pre- and post entry. In the pre-entry stage, the monopolist chooses his price and capital stock so as to maximize his discounted profits, noting that his investment decision may
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Exploitable Surplus in ,-Person Gamesitions for a profit, i.e., they realize a positive rent for their organizing function. Application is made to determining fair wages to labor, and finding equilibrium prices for legislators selling their votes.
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A Model of the U.S. Presidential Primary Campaignto delegate allocations, and variations in each primary’s electorate. Dynamic elements, e.g., “momentum,” are included, a number of propositions produced, and these propositions are tested successfully against the choices made by Reagan and Ford in the 1976 Republican campaign.
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Reinsurance as a Cooperative Gametween insurance companies can be formulated as a .-person cooperative game without transferable utilities. The determination of an “optimal reinsurance treaty” is then shown to coincide with the computation of the value of the corresponding game. A complete example is given.
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Jānis Grabis,Kurt Sandkuhl,Dirk Stamer the (math) Bargaining Set, . [19761 Ordinal Bargaining Set, M°, and several solutions based on vulnerability. The first section of this essay defines and discusses the various solution theories. Section 2 describes our experimental design, and Sections 3 and 4 review the results of these experiments.
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