Titlebook: Applied Game Theory; Proceedings of a Con S. J. Brams,A. Schotter,G. Schwödiauer Conference proceedings 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelb

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Murali Thiyagarajah,B. John Oommenas necessarily a member of any coalition that could form. The 16 games were four repetitions each of four game types, arranged in a 2 × 2 design depending on (i) whether or not the grand coalition of all four players was allowed to form and (ii) whether or not the monopolist players were symmetric.

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Américo Lopes Azevedo,Cesar Toscanos developed. Using the two candidate contest for the 1976 Republican nomination as a prototype, interest centers on the effects of variations in the institutional context in affecting candidate strategy. Variables studied include the dates of the primaries, their size, the rules translating votes in

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Murali Thiyagarajah,B. John Oommenty of winning the election. If the candidates have equal budgets it is locally optimal for them to allocate in proportion to the Banzhaf power index of each voter in the electorate. When this result is applied to the United States Electoral College, it is seen that the disparity in the power between

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Jānis Grabis,Kurt Sandkuhl,Dirk Stamerajority rule” when no Condorcet point (core) exists. The games we use in these experiments seek, in particular, to establish as much separation as possible between the predictions of several alternative solution concepts and, thereby, to provide a critical test of these competing theories. Briefly,

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Leiliane Pereira de Rezende,Stéphane Julia, the relation between value and equilibria; second, the problems of existence and non-existence of value; and third, a new way of defining value for these games, in order to guarantee its existence, which leads to interesting economic interpretations.

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Leiliane Pereira de Rezende,Stéphane Julia finite number of private goods, owned individually, which can be used for the production of the public goods and for exchanges and sidepayments in an overall compromise. The paper defines a noncooperative game for the participants whose outcomes are compromises in the exchange situations. When play

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Tommi Kähkönen,Andrey Maglyas,Kari Smolander). These situations are studied in the framework of cooperative games with coalition structures, by defining for each player a utility function with two arguments, namely his consumption bundle and the coalition to which he belongs..The optimality analysis brings out a surprising property of the gam

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Semiotics in Digital Visualisationeoretic considerations. More specifically, the only active market in our models is the labor market, and we determine and investigate its Nash equilibrium points. The models vary in the degree of influence that government has in determining the wage of public servants. It should be emphasized that i