| 书目名称 | Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity |
| 编辑 | Juliane Krämer |
| 视频video | |
| 概述 | Presents two practical physical attacks, the complexity of which has been overestimated and the implied security threats of which have been underestimated.Demonstrates that the assessment of physical |
| 丛书名称 | T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services |
| 图书封面 |  |
| 描述 | .This book presents two practical physical attacks. It shows how attackers can reveal the secret key of symmetric as well as asymmetric cryptographic algorithms based on these attacks, and presents countermeasures on the software and the hardware level that can help to prevent them in the future. Though their theory has been known for several years now, since neither attack has yet been successfully implemented in practice, they have generally not been considered a serious threat. In short, their physical attack complexity has been overestimated and the implied security threat has been underestimated. .First, the book introduces the photonic side channel, which offers not only temporal resolution, but also the highest possible spatial resolution. Due to the high cost of its initial implementation, it has not been taken seriously. The work shows both simple and differential photonic side channel analyses. Then, it presents a fault attack against pairing-based cryptography. Due to the need for at least two independent precise faults in a single pairing computation, it has not been taken seriously either..Based on these two attacks, the book demonstrates that the assessment of physica |
| 出版日期 | Book 2015 |
| 关键词 | Asymmetric cryptographic algorithms; DPEA; Higher-order fault attacks; Pairing computations; Pairing-bas |
| 版次 | 1 |
| doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-787-1 |
| isbn_softcover | 978-981-10-1299-0 |
| isbn_ebook | 978-981-287-787-1Series ISSN 2192-2810 Series E-ISSN 2192-2829 |
| issn_series | 2192-2810 |
| copyright | Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2015 |
发表于 2025-3-21 18:33:04
