| 书目名称 | Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence |
| 副标题 | The Condorcet Effici |
| 编辑 | William V. Gehrlein,Dominique Lepelley |
| 视频video | |
| 概述 | Examines the probability that voting paradoxes will be observed in elections.Applies formal mathematical probability models to the analysis of voting rules.With a focus on the Condorcet criterion.Incl |
| 丛书名称 | Studies in Choice and Welfare |
| 图书封面 |  |
| 描述 | .The likelihood of observing Condorcet‘s Paradox is known to be very low for elections with a small number of candidates if voters’ preferences on candidates reflect any significant degree of a number of different measures of mutual coherence. This reinforces the intuitive notion that strange election outcomes should become less likely as voters’ preferences become more mutually coherent. Similar analysis is used here to indicate that this notion is valid for most, but not all, other voting paradoxes. This study also focuses on the Condorcet Criterion, which states that the pairwise majority rule winner should be chosen as the election winner, if one exists. Representations for the Condorcet Efficiency of the most common voting rules are obtained here as a function of various measures of the degree of mutual coherence of voters’ preferences. An analysis of the Condorcet Efficiency representations that are obtained yields strong support for using Borda Rule.. |
| 出版日期 | Book 2011 |
| 关键词 | Borda Rule; Condorcet Efficiency; Condorcet‘s Paradox; Election Procedures; Voting Paradoxes |
| 版次 | 1 |
| doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6 |
| isbn_softcover | 978-3-642-26610-2 |
| isbn_ebook | 978-3-642-03107-6Series ISSN 1614-0311 Series E-ISSN 2197-8530 |
| issn_series | 1614-0311 |
| copyright | Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011 |
发表于 2025-3-21 19:52:55
