Titlebook: Voting Experiments; André Blais,Jean-François Laslier,Karine Van der S Book 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 Electi

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Visibility and Sanctions: The Social Norm of Voting in the Labe time and that receiving a sanction for non-voting increases the likelihood of voting in the next round by about eight percentage points. Overall, the results are consistent with a social norm model of voting.

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Coalitions, Coordination and Electoral Choice: A Lab Experimental Study of Strategic Votinghich parties will make it to the parliament, the findings are that voters cast strategic votes for small parties to a greater extent when there are substantial size differences between the coalition parties. Individual expectations of parties’ likelihood of success are crucial to the decision making.

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Introduction, one. First, voters have to form some opinions about the political candidates and their electoral environment. In the course of the campaign, they are exposed to information about the candidates, some of this information being provided by the candidates themselves and some by the media, and social o

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内阁

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Common Knowledge and Voter Coordination: Experimental Evidence from Maliis known about whether and how public information, or information shared by members the relevant public, additionally impacts voter decisionmaking relative to private information, or information available only to the relevant individual. When disseminated through public rather than private channels,

DIS

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Visibility and Sanctions: The Social Norm of Voting in the Labll scarce. In this chapter, we present the results of a laboratory experiment, conducted in two different countries, in which we manipulate the social conditions under which the elections take place. We find that both visibility and the possibility of administering and receiving sanctions boost vote