Titlebook: Verification and Compliance; A Problem-Solving Ap Michael Krepon (Senior Associate),Mary Umberger (R Book 1988 Michael Krepon and Mary Umbe

magnate

Production Monitoring for Arms Controlwanting to achieve some relief from the threat of sudden annihilation. Arms control can help nations with contrary goals to channel the competition along less threatening avenues. In the long run, arms control can also help reduce their competition.

检查

New Technologies and the ABM Treatyoal the treaty limits ABM systems in quantity, in basing mode, and to certain agreed deployment areas. In addition, the traditional interpretation of the treaty would impose sharp limits on the development, testing, and deployment of ABM components that are not interceptor missiles, fixed land-based launchers, or radars.

Polydipsia

Improving the Utility and Effectiveness of the Standing Consultative Commissionance problems, such as the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, have not been satisfactorily resolved in the forum created to address SALT compliance questions—the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).

SOW

U.S. Government Organization for Arms Control Verification and Compliancenal security affairs and the NSC staff. The act further seeks to “enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security,” but does not mandate procedures as to how this objective might be accomplished.

疼死我了

riminating between groups and classifying individuals or objects into categories. Throughout, it was assumed that the measurement of the variables under consideration was in . terms. Furthermore, it was also assumed that the variables in question were normally distributed (at least approximately) and that the regression relationship was linear.

CLAM

Verifying Controls on Cruise Missiles U.S. TOMAHAWK-class sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and the Soviet AS-15 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), that have emerged from technologies for smaller engines, warheads, and guidance systems. Their small sizes contribute to their survivability, for they are largely invisible to many air defense radars.

obsolete

Counting Rulesed vulnerabilities and political tensions can grow substantially. This was certainly true in the SALT decade, when U.S. and Soviet leaders could easily count the progression of counterforce weapons systems each felt compelled to deploy. Strategic modernization and targeting requirements grew apace.

FUSE

The Sources of Soviet Compliance Behaviort one another about the limits of permissible behavior. Pinpointing the workings of Soviet internal decision-making on national security is particularly difficult; the temptation is great to oversimplify Soviet motivations and behavior, and to gloss over the way in which the Soviet approach to compliance interacts with U.S. behavior.