Titlebook: United States Army Doctrine; Adapting to Politica David C. Rasmussen Book 2020 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclu

Hyperalgesia

1954 Case Study,lment of campaign promises to reduce defense spending and overseas ground troop commitments to allies—campaign promises he made to secure and maintain the support of the right wing of the Republican Party. President Eisenhower promised the Republican right that he would cut the defense budget by 30%

grudging

1962 Case Study,ty for the US military to operate at any level of war—especially low-intensity unconventional war. As part of this effort, he directed the Army in writing to update its doctrine and to make low-intensity warfare a mission responsibility for the entire Army, not just the special forces branch of the

制定

1976 Case Study,Operations), to focus exclusively on fighting a single foe: Soviet Russia. Never before, and never since, has the Army focused on fighting a single adversary, but never before had the two major US political parties been so united in opposing the policies of a disgraced president. The Army took advan

纬线

尾随

Cloudburst

Book 2020he end of WWII: 1) in 1954 it made a shift from a doctrine focused almost exclusively on mid-intensity conventional warfare to a doctrine that added significant emphasis to high-intensity nuclear warfare; 2) in 1962 it made an even greater shift in the opposite direction toward low-intensity unconve

鞭子

machination

vascular

MOAT

1954 Case Study,ff at the time, General Matthew Ridgway, argued that such cuts would prevent the Army from accomplishing its primary land warfare mission, from deterring its adversaries, and would prevent it from fulfilling its existing US treaty commitments—especially in Europe.