Titlebook: US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat; Lawrence Freedman Book 1977 Lawrence David Freedman 1977 army.defence policy.NATO.Superpo

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The Estimating Process,k on the same subject at different times from the various departments, and these reports often conflicted.’ With the new system, starting with the Central Intelligence Group, Truman believed that his difficulties were over: ‘Here, at last, a coordinated method had been worked out, and a practical wa

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The Missile Gap,r the extent to which they generate heat as well as light. One of these is the salience of intelligence debates for debates in the wider defence establishment on such matters as strategic doctrine and force planning. The military services, as participants in both sets of debates, ensure that other m

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Greater-Than-Expected Threats,telligence community in this area later became a matter of controversy, in that the overestimation of the missile gap days was followed by comparable underestimation, the NIE 11–8 series on Soviet Offensive Arms was not the most contested of all the estimates. In part this was . once, members of the

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An Invulnerable Deterrent,ming first strike. Though it had been assumed in the early stages of the atomic age that offensive forces could not be detected or attacked with sufficient accuracy to render them vulnerable, this assumption came to be challenged in the 1950s. It was pointed out that it was not enough to have forces

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The Nixon Administration: Protecting Minuteman Through Safeguard, the cities affected, generating a considerable outcry against the ABM system. While the citizens expressed their anxieties about their real estate and the close proximity of nuclear weapons, scientists and other opponents of the Sentinel concept articulated most of the major technical and strategic

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