| 书目名称 | Three Concepts of Time | | 编辑 | Kenneth G. Denbigh | | 视频video | | | 图书封面 |  | | 描述 | The existence of so many strangely puzzling, even contradictory, aspects of ‘time‘ is due, I think, to the fact that we obtain our ideas about temporal succession from more than one source - from inner experience, on the one side, and from the physical world on the other. ‘Time‘ is thus a composite notion and as soon as we distinguish clearly between the ideas deriving from the different sources it becomes apparent that there is not just one time-concept but several. Perhaps they should be called variants, but in any case they need to be seen as distinct. In this book I shall aim at characteri sing what I believe to be the three most basic of them. These form a sort of hierarchy of increasing richness, but diminishing symmetry. Any adequate inquiry into ‘time‘ is necessarily partly scientific and partly philosophical. This creates a difficulty since what may be elementary reading to scientists may not be so to philosophers, and vice versa. For this reason I have sought to present the book at a level which is less ‘advanced‘ than that of a specialist monograph. Due to my own background there is an inevitable bias towards the scientific aspects oftime. Certainly the issues I have ta | | 出版日期 | Book 1981 | | 关键词 | Invariant; Zeit; biology; causality; entropy; objectivity; time | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-68082-3 | | isbn_softcover | 978-3-540-10757-6 | | isbn_ebook | 978-3-642-68082-3 | | copyright | Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1981 |
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发表于 2025-3-21 17:44:15
