| 书目名称 | The Value of Signals in Hidden Action Models | | 副标题 | Concepts, Applicatio | | 编辑 | Wendelin Schnedler | | 视频video | | | 概述 | Includes supplementary material: | | 丛书名称 | Contributions to Economics | | 图书封面 |  | | 描述 | Since the fundamental work of Walras (1874), markets have received particular attention by economists because they lead to an efficient allocation of goods and services. However, the proper functioning of markets rests on certain assumptions. For instance, the good or ser vice which is to be traded must be clearly defined. This elementary requirement is often violated in reality, in particular when services are concerned. Consider the example of railway workers who are hired to lay tracks. A labour contract which stipulates a fixed wage and defines the workers‘ task as "laying tracks" is rather unspecific. Workers may profit from this vagueness by reducing effort to a comfortable amount -as long as tracks are laid, they do not violate contract conditions. Thus, an im precise definition of the service can result in inefficiently low efforts. An obvious solution to this problem is a clearer definition of the ser vice, but often this way is barred: To specify, for instance, all actions which are involved in laying tracks and which may vary with weather, surface and other conditions is far too complicated and too costly. In deed, labour contracts seldom give a detailed account of t | | 出版日期 | Book 2004 | | 关键词 | censored estimation; economics; effort misallocation; hidden action models; personnel economics; principa | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2706-4 | | isbn_softcover | 978-3-7908-0173-6 | | isbn_ebook | 978-3-7908-2706-4Series ISSN 1431-1933 Series E-ISSN 2197-7178 | | issn_series | 1431-1933 | | copyright | Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004 |
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发表于 2025-3-21 19:43:08
