| 书目名称 | The Theory of Extensive Form Games |
| 编辑 | Carlos Alós-Ferrer,Klaus Ritzberger |
| 视频video | |
| 概述 | Addresses extensive form games in full generality without any finiteness assumptions.Synthesizes earlier approaches to the representation of extensive form games.Includes numerous examples and illustr |
| 丛书名称 | Springer Series in Game Theory |
| 图书封面 |  |
| 描述 | .This book treats extensive form game theory in full generality. It provides a framework that does not rely on any finiteness assumptions at all, yet covers the finite case. The presentation starts by identifying the appropriate concept of a game tree. This concept represents a synthesis of earlier approaches, including the graph-theoretical and the decision-theoretical ones. It then provides a general model of sequential, interpersonal decision making, called extensive decision problems. Extensive forms are a special case thereof, which is such that all strategy profiles induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Requiring the existence of immediate predecessors yields discrete extensive forms, which are still general enough to cover almost all applications. The treatment culminates in a characterization of the topologies on the plays of the game tree that admit equilibrium analysis.. |
| 出版日期 | Book 2016 |
| 关键词 | Equilibrium analysis; Extensive form game; Game theory; Game trees; Infinite games |
| 版次 | 1 |
| doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49944-3 |
| isbn_softcover | 978-3-662-57050-0 |
| isbn_ebook | 978-3-662-49944-3Series ISSN 1868-517X Series E-ISSN 1868-5188 |
| issn_series | 1868-517X |
| copyright | Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016 |
发表于 2025-3-21 17:19:07
