书目名称 | The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design |
编辑 | Keith L. Dougherty,Julian Edward |
视频video | |
概述 | Illustrates how computer based models can help us better understand political science and how they can be used to extend rational choice theory.Connects normative theories of how to make better consti |
丛书名称 | Studies in Public Choice |
图书封面 |  |
描述 | .Buchanan and Tullock’s seminal work, .The Calculus of Consent., linked economic methodology to substantive questions in political science. Among the major contributions of their book is a connection between constitutional decision making and contractarianism, a philosophical tradition that proponents believe can give institutions legitimacy. In other words, a major contribution of their book is a clear connection between empirical decision making and normative principles. The current book formalizes and extends their foundational ideas as it attempts to show how economic and philosophical arguments about the "best" voting rules can be used to improve constitutional design. It informs debates about constitutional political economy in comparative politics, democratic theory, and public choice. Political scientists often ask questions about what causes a nation to seek a new constitution, how constitutions are made, and what factors allow for corrupt decision making. .The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design. bridges the gap between normative questions about which institutions are most efficient and fair and empirical questions about how constitutions are formed. This provid |
出版日期 | Book 20111st edition |
关键词 | Gordon Tullock; James Buchanan; computational modeling; contractarianism |
版次 | 1 |
doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-98171-0 |
isbn_softcover | 978-1-4614-2843-5 |
isbn_ebook | 978-0-387-98171-0Series ISSN 0924-4700 Series E-ISSN 2731-5258 |
issn_series | 0924-4700 |
copyright | Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011 |