书目名称 | The Alternating Double Auction Market |
副标题 | A Game Theoretic and |
编辑 | Abdolkarim Sadrieh |
视频video | http://file.papertrans.cn/905/904253/904253.mp4 |
丛书名称 | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems |
图书封面 |  |
描述 | The alternating double auction market institution is presented as a discrete time version of the open outcry market. The game in extensive form is analyzed in an almost perfect information setting, using the concept of subgame perfectness. By applying two new equilibrium selection criteria, a general existence result is obtained for "impatience equilibria" of the game. All such equilibria are shown to have unique properties concerning the traded quantities and prices. The most important results are that the equilibrium prices are independent of the number of traders and are always very close to - if not inside - the range of competitive prices. The latter can be evaluated as game theoretic support for the convergence of prices to the competitive price. The process of price formation is traced by applying the learning direction theory and introducing the "anchor price hypothesis". |
出版日期 | Book 1998 |
关键词 | Analysis; Experimental economics; Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung; Spieltheorie; auctions; game theor |
版次 | 1 |
doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58953-9 |
isbn_softcover | 978-3-540-64895-6 |
isbn_ebook | 978-3-642-58953-9Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957 |
issn_series | 0075-8442 |
copyright | Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998 |