| 书目名称 | The Limits of Logical Empiricism |
| 副标题 | Selected Papers of A |
| 编辑 | ALFONS KEUPINK,SANFORD SHIEH |
| 视频video | |
| 概述 | Demonstrates the importance of Pap‘s work for the development of analytic philosophy of science.Illustrates how Pap‘s work was the central reference on modality in analytic philosophy before Kripke.Pa |
| 丛书名称 | Synthese Library |
| 图书封面 |  |
| 描述 | .Arthur Pap’s work played an important role in the development of the analytic tradition. This role goes beyond the merely historical fact that Pap’s views of dispositional and modal concepts were influential. As a sympathetic critic of logical empiricism, Pap, like Quine, saw a deep tension in logical empiricism at its very best in the work of Carnap. But Pap’s critique of Carnap is quite different from Quine’s, and represents the discovery of limits beyond which empiricism cannot go, where there lies nothing other than intuitive knowledge of logic itself. Pap’s arguments for this intuitive knowledge anticipate Etchemendy’s recent critique of the model-theoretic account of logical consequence. Pap’s work also anticipates prominent developments in the contemporary neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics championed by Wright and Hale. Finally, Pap’s major philosophical preoccupation, the concepts of necessity and possibility, provides distinctive solutions and perspectives on issues of contemporary concern in the metaphysics of modality. In particular, Pap’s account of modality allows us to see the significance of Kripke’s well-known arguments on necessity and apriority in a new light |
| 出版日期 | Book 2006 |
| 关键词 | Proposition; Rudolf Carnap; dispositions; interpret; knowledge; logic; logical consequence; logical empiric |
| 版次 | 1 |
| doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-4299-X |
| isbn_softcover | 978-90-481-7099-9 |
| isbn_ebook | 978-1-4020-4299-7Series ISSN 0166-6991 Series E-ISSN 2542-8292 |
| issn_series | 0166-6991 |
| copyright | Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006 |
发表于 2025-3-21 18:24:04
