Titlebook: Substance and Attribute; A Study in Ontology Michael J. Loux Book 1978 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordecht, Holland 1978 Interpretation.

Inveterate

Abstract Reference and Universalsdication and resemblance. Of the traditional approaches to universals, then, we are left with that based on the phenomenon of abstract reference. If the realist is to convince us that we should embrace the ontological framework he recommends, he will have to base his case on the claim that the truth

Scintigraphy

Towards a Realistic Ontologylarity’ and ‘redness’ occur in true sentences. As they occur in such sentences, I argued, they appear to be functioning as singular terms referring to universals. Then, I examined the various accounts of abstract reference provided by the nominalist and extreme nominalist. Finding none of those acco

ostensible

Two Theories of Substanceariety of ways. My use of the term will be tied to a long tradition (one stemming from Aristotle) in which the term ‘substance’ is used in contrast with the term ‘attribute’, so that substances are particulars that can exemplify attributes, but cannot themselves be exemplified. In this tradition the

低三下四之人

抱狗不敢前

Bare Substrataualitatively indiscernible, the bundle theorist’s attempt to construe substances as wholes whose constituents are exclusively properties breaks down. But Objection IV is not meant merely as a refutation of the bundle theory; as we saw in Chapter Six, it presents itself as well as an argument establi