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Titlebook: Subgame Consistent Cooperation; A Comprehensive Trea David W.K. Yeung,Leon A. Petrosyan Book 2016 Springer Science+Business Media Singapore

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书目名称Subgame Consistent Cooperation
副标题A Comprehensive Trea
编辑David W.K. Yeung,Leon A. Petrosyan
视频video
概述Provides a comprehensive coverage of subgame consistent cooperation.Presents solution techniques for complex subgame consistent cooperation.Equips readers to design sustainable collaboration plans.Ill
丛书名称Theory and Decision Library C
图书封面Titlebook: Subgame Consistent Cooperation; A Comprehensive Trea David W.K. Yeung,Leon A. Petrosyan Book 2016 Springer Science+Business Media Singapore
描述.Strategic behavior in the human and social world has been increasingly recognized in theory and practice. It is well known that non-cooperative behavior could lead to suboptimal or even highly undesirable outcomes. Cooperation suggests the possibility of obtaining socially optimal solutions and the calls for cooperation are prevalent in real-life problems. Dynamic cooperation cannot be sustainable if there is no guarantee that the agreed upon optimality principle at the beginning is maintained throughout the cooperation duration. It is due to the lack of this kind of guarantees that cooperative schemes fail to last till its end or even fail to get started. The property of .subgame consistency. in cooperative dynamic games and the corresponding solution mechanism resolve this “classic” problem in game theory. .             This book is a comprehensive treatise on subgame consistent dynamic cooperation covering the up-to-date state of the art analyses in this important topic. It sets out to provide the theory, solution techniques and applications of subgame consistent cooperation in a wide spectrum of paradigms for analysis which includes cooperative dynamic game models with stochas
出版日期Book 2016
关键词Differential Games; Stochastic Differential Games; Randomly-Furcating; Asynchronous Players’ Horizons; D
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1545-8
isbn_softcover978-981-10-9382-1
isbn_ebook978-981-10-1545-8Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044
issn_series 0924-6126
copyrightSpringer Science+Business Media Singapore 2016
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Subgame Consistency Under Asynchronous Players’ Horizonst duration for leases and contracts. Asynchronous horizon game situations occur frequently in economic and social activities. In this Chapter, subgame consistent cooperative solutions are derived for differential games with asynchronous players’ horizons and uncertain types of future players. Analyt
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Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solution in NTU Differential Gamestion policy to a later starting time and any possible state brought about by prior optimal behavior of the players would remain optimal. In many game situations payoff (or utility) of players may not be transferable. It is well known that utility in economic study is assumed to be non-transferrable
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