| 书目名称 | Studies in No-Self Physicalism | | 编辑 | Feng Ye | | 视频video | | | 概述 | Develops a philosophical worldview that is truly consistent with contemporary mainstream science.Shows how a most minimalistic and radical version of physicalism can accommodate aspects and issues.Int | | 图书封面 |  | | 描述 | .This book demonstrates how a radical version of physicalism (‘No-Self Physicalism’) can offer an internally coherent and comprehensive philosophical worldview. It first argues that a coherent physicalist should explicitly treat a cognitive subject merely as a physical thing and should not vaguely assume an amorphous or even soul-like subject or self. This approach forces the physicalist to re-examine traditional core philosophical notions such as truth, analyticity, modality, apriority because our traditional understandings of them appear to be predicated on a cognitive subject that is not literally just a physical thing..In turn, working on the assumption that a cognitive subject is itself completely physical, namely a neural network-based robot programmed by evolution (hence the term ‘No-Self’), the book proposes physicalistic theories on conceptual representation, truth, analyticity, modality, the nature of mathematics, epistemic justification, knowledge, apriority andintuition, as well as a physicalistic ontology. These are meant to show that this No-Self Physicalism, perhaps the most minimalistic and radical version of physicalism proposed to date, can accommodate many aspect | | 出版日期 | Book 2023 | | 关键词 | No-Self Physicalism; Physicalistic Theory of Representation; Physicalistic Theory of Truth; Physicalist | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8143-2 | | isbn_softcover | 978-981-19-8145-6 | | isbn_ebook | 978-981-19-8143-2 | | copyright | The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapor |
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发表于 2025-3-21 19:00:29
