| 书目名称 | Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups |
| 副标题 | A Game Theoretic App |
| 编辑 | Nina Ismael |
| 视频video | |
| 概述 | Applies game theory to the phenomenon of terrorism.Explains why dramatic terrorist attacks occur at all.Presents empirical evidence on the rivalry of al-Qaeda and Daesh |
| 丛书名称 | SpringerBriefs in Economics |
| 图书封面 |  |
| 描述 | This book applies game theory to the phenomenon of terrorism and investigates how the competition for support can influence the attack behavior of terror organizations. In addition, it examines the economics of terrorism. . .The so-called outbidding theory, which has become increasingly popular within the field of terrorism research, argues that terror groups vying for resources will engage in more and more violence to demonstrate their capabilities and commitment to their cause. This book challenges the outbidding concept by providing a game-theoretical analysis, which shows that a contest between two terror groups can be interpreted as a race for support. This interpretation may help explain why major attacks occur at all: not as a result of outbidding, but as a result of losing the race. In addition, the author shows that rivalry between terror groups does not necessarily lead to more attacks, but can result in less terrorism due to an increased probability of attack failure induced by the race. Lastly, the model is applied to the rivalry between al-Qaeda and Daesh, elaborated on with empirical evidence. . .Given its scope, the book is a must read for researches and scholars |
| 出版日期 | Book 2020 |
| 关键词 | Defence economics; National security; Outbidding theory; Al-Qaeda; Daesh; Isis; Rivalry between terror gro |
| 版次 | 1 |
| doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51307-8 |
| isbn_softcover | 978-3-030-51306-1 |
| isbn_ebook | 978-3-030-51307-8Series ISSN 2191-5504 Series E-ISSN 2191-5512 |
| issn_series | 2191-5504 |
| copyright | The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 |
发表于 2025-3-21 16:27:05
