Titlebook: State, Anarchy, Collective Decisions; Some Applications of Alex Talbot Coram Book 2001 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishe

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Struggles over Property with Stealing, Production and Guarding - Non-Co-operative Games,d produce orderly anarchy, as writers such as Taylor (1982) claim? If there is stability, at what level? If stability is at a sufficiently high level of production it might not be worthwhile extending the state to protect property. Alternatively, would it be characterized by most efforts going to piracy and little to production?

NAUT

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Outmoded

State, Anarchy and Game Theory, centralized authority is necessary to enforce such decisions. These questions have been around, in their modern form, at least since the time of Hobbes‘s Leviathan and Locke‘s Two Treatises of Government. They are central to much of modern formal theory as well as to popular debates between propone

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Problems of Reputation and Markets for Protection - Non-Co-operative Games,er manner. This chapter investigates some aspects of this possibility. Nozick argues, for example, that, in a state of nature without Hobbesian problems, something like a market for protection could emerge and produce a solution to the general problem of security for property.. In this case, if the

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Collective Decisions and the Core - Co-operative Games,ual choice by setting up some mechanism which allows them to make collective choices about rules and outcomes, and to enforce those choices. It will be recalled from the analysis of collective optimality in section 1.8 that this means, in principle, that individuals could agree to move to an outcome