Titlebook: State Liability for Breaches of European Law; An economic analysis Bert Roosebeke Book 2007 Gabler Verlag | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden G

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Treating Breaches: The Law’s and the Court’s Answerrt of Justice’s Francovich decision. in 1991, scholarly interest in the field of state liability exploded, making authors start articles “requiring apology for any more”. or title them “Once more unto the Breach”.. This chapter aims at providing an in-depth analysis of the primary legislation as wel

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CARE

Evaluation of the Current Situation: Two Distinct Enforcement Mechanisms is how exactly this aim can be reached successfully in practice. This chapter will distinguish between two enforcement mechanisms: a . and . one. After this initial distinction we will then go on comparing both.

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Procedural Aspects. Private and Public Enforcement: Complements or Substitutes?re under primary legislation is a public enforcement procedure, with the European Commission acting as some kind of . and the European Court of Justice as judge. The Francovich procedure functions similar to a privately initiated enforcement procedure before national judges.

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d a topic which is rather unusual to the literature of law and economics in a number of ways. This work does not – as does the huge majority of law and economics scholarship – deal with individual behaviour, as addressed by private law. Rather does the author analyse state behaviour as governed by E

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Are Breaches really that Bad? A Rationale not to allow Breachesin case of a conflict. Should one stubbornly stick to the agreement or should one allow for breaches? This short chapter is a brief economic analysis of the preferability of breaches of European law. Due to the special nature of the agreement, we thus discuss a situation with characteristics of both contract law and law enforcement.

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