| 书目名称 | Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria |
| 编辑 | Eric Damme |
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| 图书封面 |  |
| 描述 | I have been pleased with the favourable reception of the first edition of this book and I am grateful to have the opportunity to prepare this second edition. In this revised and enlarged edition I corrected some misprints and errors that occurred in the first edition (fortunately I didn‘t find too many) and I added a large number of notes that give the reader an impression of what kind of results have been obtained since the first edition was printed and that give an indication of the direction the subject is taking. Many of the notes discuss (or refer to papers discussing) applications of the refinements that are considered. Of course, it is the quantity and the quality of the insights and the applications that lend the refinements their validity. Although the guide to the applications is far from complete, the notes certainly allow the reader to form a good judgement of which refinements have really yielded new insights. Hence, as in the first edition, I will refrain from speculating on which refinements of Nash equilibria will survive in the long run. To defend this position let me also cite Binmore [1990] who compares writing about refinements to the Herculean task of defeating |
| 出版日期 | Textbook 1991Latest edition |
| 关键词 | Nash Equilibrium; Nash-Gleichgewicht; Nicht-kooperative Spieltheorie; Refinements; Spieltheorie; game the |
| 版次 | 2 |
| doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4 |
| isbn_softcover | 978-3-540-53800-4 |
| isbn_ebook | 978-3-642-58242-4 |
| copyright | Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991 |
发表于 2025-3-21 19:49:13
