Titlebook: Sovereign Debt Crises and Negotiations in Brazil and Mexico, 1888-1914; Governments versus B Leonardo Weller Book 2018 The Editor(s) (if ap

草率女

From Defaults to Redemption: Mexico, 1821–1890exclusivity over Mexico’s debt. Yet the government refused to have a patron bank and issued a second loan through different underwriters in the following year. That enabled Mexican negotiators to bargain for cheap credit.

Noisome

烦扰

充满装饰

Armory

拍翅

暗语

Conclusionfered, but one conclusion holds: The governments acted as independent players, devising their approaches to underwriters based on country-specific payoffs. Whenever they could, high officials took advantage of their relative power over bankers to borrow cheaply.

并排上下

禁止,切断

BLUSH

Governments versus Bankers in the Pre-1914 Sovereign Debt Marketnds—and assumed that governments were passive when negotiating borrowing conditions. This chapter addresses the role of governments as independent decision-makers. Governments decided whether to grant exclusivity to a single patron bank or to negotiate with competing banks to reduce borrowing costs.