Titlebook: Software Process Improvement and Capability Determination; 11th International C Rory V. O’Connor,Terry Rout,Alec Dorling Conference proceed

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Angela M. Alves,Marcelo Pessoa,Clênio F. Salviano Given, he describes his earlier account as having been flawed by his having equated the idea of the . of perceptual experience with that of its .. While agreeing with this criticism, I suggest that McDowell’s diagnosis of the earlier problem, as well as his suggestions for its solution, are obscure

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Smitha Bhandary,Shah Quadri topic. I argue that, for Hegel, sensation takes in the look or shape of things, but that consciousness and intuition actively “posit” what we see and feel as a world of .. In McDowell’s view, this commits my Hegel to “subjective idealism.” I argue, by contrast, that Hegel avoids such idealism, beca

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Matthias Raskingcan provide us with conceptual resources for answering particular problems concerning the philosophy of mind, the nature of our conceptual activity, and the character of knowledge. One of these problems concerns the nature of perceptual experience, and it is the core of a controversy called “the deb

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Fran O’Haranceptual” (UC) is one of the central theoretical aspects (if not . central theoretical aspect) that McDowell claims to share with Hegel. In this chapter, I claim that the Hegelian version of UC has a specific ontological and metaphysical import that implies an excess with respect to McDowell’s “ther

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