Titlebook: Social Design; Essays in Memory of Walter Trockel Book 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 Economic Design.Mechanism Design.Game Theo

中世纪

Second Thoughts of Social Dilemma in Mechanism Designroblems such as social dilemmas. We design a simple mechanism to achieve Pareto efficiency in social dilemmas and then compare the performance of this mechanism with and without second thoughts. First, second thoughts change the payoff structure of the game in favor of cooperation. Second, this mech

漂亮才会豪华

最低点

The Role of (Quasi) Analyticity in Establishing Completeness of Financial Markets Equilibriaently. Given the fundamental nature of this result various extensions have been proposed. In the present paper we prove all results under optimal condition. Namely, we only assume quasi-analyticity rather than analyticity of the basic economic ingredients, and we prove everything based solely on thi

Ruptured-Disk

Are We There Yet? Mechanism Design Beyond Equilibriumr not an equilibrium has been achieved, then the desiderata by which we evaluate mechanisms in these situations need to include more than merely the properties of their equilibria (are the equilibria Pareto optimal; are they in dominant strategies; are they stable; etc.). For the classical public-go

CHAFE

expansive

frozen-shoulder