| 书目名称 | Social Choice Mechanisms | | 编辑 | Vladimir I. Danilov,Alexander I. Sotskov | | 视频video | | | 概述 | This book contains the most important concepts and results of the theory of social choice mechanisms.Includes supplementary material: | | 丛书名称 | Studies in Economic Design | | 图书封面 |  | | 描述 | The theory of social choice deals with both the processes and results of col lective decision making. In this book, we explore some issues in the theory of social choice and mechanism design. We examine the premises of this theory, the axiomatic approach, and the mechanism design approach. The main questions are what is collective interest, how is it related to individuals‘ interests, how should one design social interactions, laws, and in stitutions? These questions are not new. Philosophers, social scientists have indeed pondered upon them for years. And, in fact, the organizational struc tures of many social institutions -courts, parliaments, committees and reg ulatory boards -often lack a sound theoretical base. This is not surprising, as it is, indeed, difficult to provide for a comprehensive formalization of the activities of such organizations. Nevertheless, there has been a definite trend towards providing clear and unambiguous rules for collective decision mak ing. These very rules constitute the body of social choice theory and its main object. The basic problem of social choice We explain here more precisely what a problem of social choice is, what approaches might | | 出版日期 | Book 2002 | | 关键词 | Equilibrium Concept; Game Form; Implementation; Mechanism; Social Choice Correspondence; Social Choice Th | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24805-7 | | isbn_softcover | 978-3-642-07715-9 | | isbn_ebook | 978-3-540-24805-7Series ISSN 2510-3970 Series E-ISSN 2510-3989 | | issn_series | 2510-3970 | | copyright | Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002 |
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发表于 2025-3-21 19:21:03
