Titlebook: Security of FPGA-Accelerated Cloud Computing Environments; Jakub Szefer,Russell Tessier Book 2024 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Au

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Anthology

Practical Implementations of Remote Power Side-Channel and Fault-Injection Attacks on Multitenant Flability of FPGAs in the cloud fueled research on the security risks associated with exposing FPGA fabric to remote users. The most notable result is the discovery that remote access to cloud FPGAs presents an entirely new attack surface: that of remotely executed electrical-level attacks, which lev

Corroborate

Cross-board Power-Based FPGA, CPU, and GPU Covert Channels,multi-tenant and virtualized setups have shown that FPGAs need to be dedicated on a per-user basis in potentially untrusted settings, such as in cloud environment virtual machines. In this chapter, we introduce a new attack that highlights that other aspects of shared infrastructure can also lead to

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Microarchitectural Vulnerabilities Introduced, Exploited, and Accelerated by Heterogeneous FPGA-CPUhas uncovered a variety of vulnerabilities on shared compute devices like CPUs and GPUs which pose a substantial thread to cloud service providers and customers alike, but heterogeneous FPGA-CPU microarchitectures require reassessment of common assumptions about isolation and security boundaries, as

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Domain Isolation and Access Control in Multi-tenant Cloud FPGAs,ation and security at the system level in multi-tenant FPGA clouds. The approach we present leverages the Flux Advanced Security Kernel (FLASK) architecture to inherit security policies from software down to hardware accelerators on FPGAs where enforcement mechanisms are implemented. This approach h

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Practical Implementations of Remote Power Side-Channel and Fault-Injection Attacks on Multitenant Fs) are presented. In the second, the experimental results of attacks on various FPGA boards, including data center acceleration cards, are shown and discussed. Finally, to facilitate future research, the implementations of a selection of the FPGA circuits enabling the attacks are shared as open sour

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