Titlebook: Risk Sharing, Risk Spreading and Efficient Regulation; T.V.S. Ramamohan Rao Book 2016 Springer India 2016 Cost Sharing.Financial Crises an

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Introduction, need to share risks. Risks can be either exogenous to the contracting parties or generated by them (endogenous). In particular, information asymmetry creates adverse selection and exogenous randomness while endogenous randomness is due to moral hazard. The principal agent models essentially contain

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Conferences and Publications, the tendency of many authors rushing the dissemination of their discoveries. Second, there is an increase in the willingness to accept and finance such activities. Clearly, both these features tend to be sustainable only because the parties involved in the transactions feel that they have something

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Knowledge Intensity and Risk Sharing,d to scale up technology) to “work a patent.” Informal knowledge must be provided by the inventor through his participation. Adverse selection of partners and their personal interests (moral hazard) may create risks. These problems have been highlighted in the context of biotechnology in particular.

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Technology Transfer,ge in the use of technology, in addition to formal technological details, to their joint venture partners. They also share in the capital investments to elicit greater commitment. Theoretical explanation of the channels through which such sharing affects the contract parameters is however inadequate

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Equity Participation,ncipal agent models account for the moral hazard in terms of the randomness in revenue generated. Equity sharing arrangements, which have important commitment and control effects, can be expected to eliminate the moral hazard and produce royalty arrangements consistent with empirically observed styl

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Warranties and Risk Sharing,t this approach can explain limited warranties and limited warranty duration. The existing literature on warranties is ambivalent about the relationship between quality of products and warranties. In contrast, we argue that there is a definite relationship between warranties, technological complexit