| 书目名称 | Resolving Development Disputes Through Negotiations | | 编辑 | Timothy J. Sullivan | | 视频video | http://file.papertrans.cn/829/828496/828496.mp4 | | 丛书名称 | Environment, Development and Public Policy: Environmental Policy and Planning | | 图书封面 |  | | 描述 | In the last decade, disputes between developers and local commu nities over proposed construction projects have led to increasing litiga tion. Environmental legislation, in particular, has greatly enhanced the rights and powers of organized groups that desire to participate in local development decisions. These powers have allowed citizen groups to block undesired and socially unacceptable projects, such as highways through urban areas and sprawling suburban developments. At the same time, these powers have produced a collective inability to construct many needed projects that produce adverse local impacts. Prisons, airports, hos pitals, waste treatment plants, and energy facilities all face years of liti gation before a final decision. At times, prolonged litigation has pro duced especially high costs to all participants. Despite these new powers, citizen action has often been limited to participation in public hearings or adjudicatory proceedings. Typically, this occurs so late in the decision process that citizen input has very little affect in shaping a project‘s design. Those who dislike some element of a project often have little choice other than to oppose the entire pr | | 出版日期 | Book 1984 | | 关键词 | Import; Urban Areas; controlling; development; environment; negotiations | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-2757-8 | | isbn_softcover | 978-1-4612-9705-5 | | isbn_ebook | 978-1-4613-2757-8 | | copyright | Plenum Press, New York 1984 |
| 1 |
Front Matter |
|
|
Abstract
|
| 2 |
,Introduction, |
Timothy J. Sullivan |
|
Abstract
Life is full of negotiations. Even childhood work and play involve bargaining. Trading household chores with a brother or sister or trading toys with a playmate gives us early experience with the potential of bargaining for solving and creating problems. As one matures, one finds that being older, stronger, or smarter does not guarantee that one always gets one’s way. Few people are born into a family where preferences are complementary or where rigid hierarchies require absolute obedience. If give-and-take do not rule the day, we nevertheless spend a great deal of time doing it. Reciprocal backscratching beats the contortions necessary for self-sufficiency. Even childhood experience suggests that nonnegotiable demands are intolerable. Sooner or later, these demands lead a sibling to passive resistance or to a more active fight. Although life has some situations where one only wins what another loses, more often reciprocal concessions leave all better off. The trick, of course, is to find the right combinations. Is washing dishes or profit sharing the better offer for a younger brother’s help with the Sunday’s newspaper deliveries? One has to know one’s brother, or at least remain
|
| 3 |
,Why Negotiate or Mediate Development Conflicts?, |
Timothy J. Sullivan |
|
Abstract
In 1972, a consortium of five electric utilities led by the Montana Power Company announced a decision to construct two 700-megawatt coal-burning plants at Colstrip, Montana. These plants would join two plants already generating electricity at the Colstrip site. A combination of low-sulfur Montana coal and sophisticated flue gas desulfurization devices (scrubbers) enabled the two existing plants to rank among the cleanest power plants in the country. The newly proposed plants, although larger, would also burn the same low-sulfur coal and use scrubbers to control emissions. Utility officials expected to receive routine approvals from all state and federal reviewing agencies (Sullivan, 1984).
|
| 4 |
,Negotiations Can Fail, |
Timothy J. Sullivan |
|
Abstract
Homer’s . begins with sacrilege, injustice, and great anger. King Agamemnon refuses the ransom offered by the priest Chryses for his daughter Chryseis. Chryses prays to the god Apollo, who brings a plague upon the Greek forces seizing Troy. Calchas, a Greek diviner, rightly blames the plague on Agamemnon, and public debate forces him to return his battle prize, Chryseis, to her father.
|
| 5 |
,Groups in Negotiations, |
Timothy J. Sullivan |
|
Abstract
Groups interact in settings that shape both the group and the negotiations. Further, the internal structure of a group affects its relations with the external world and its ability to negotiate. This chapter examines the effects of bargaining environment, group structure, and group leadership on negotiation and mediation. An analysis of the highly structured setting and groups of industrial relations, the formal setting of international affairs, and the less structured settings and groups of environmental-development disputes shows how society, custom, and law can shape an organization and its ability to bargain effectively. The disputants in these settings include a diverse range of groups. They include labor unions, management associations, national governments, and advocacy groups that differ in their objectives, leadership structure, and membership rules.
|
| 6 |
,Factors in Bargaining That Affect Negotiation and Mediation Success, |
Timothy J. Sullivan |
|
Abstract
The bargaining procedures and protocols that structure negotiations can differ as dramatically as the organizational structures of the groups involved in negotiations. These features of the bargaining environment can range in formality from those set by law or custom to those adopted on an ad hoc basis. In each bargaining setting, the presence or absence of certain features can affect the likelihood of bargaining progress. These includes:
|
| 7 |
,Tactical Aspects of Bargaining and Mediation, |
Timothy J. Sullivan |
|
Abstract
In any bargaining situation, the representatives of the bargaining groups will take actions to enhance the likelihood that a settlement will favor their interests. Each side will try to determine how the choice of a particular issue agenda or bargaining tactic will affect the final settlement. Although bargainers choose issue agendas, strategies, and tactics to advance their interests, at times these actions may actually limit the chances of reaching a settlement. Even when a settlement could leave both sides better off than the continuation of the dispute, bargaining tactics can create obstacles that prevent a successful search for an agreement.
|
| 8 |
,Information and Communication, Negotiation, and Mediation, |
Timothy J. Sullivan |
|
Abstract
It is through communication that bargainers reach settlements. Effective communication provides several positive benefits to bargainers. Communication can enable negotiators to exploit the cooperative elements present in bargaining. A communication of basic interests can permit bargainers to develop new alternatives that offer both sides gains. When several issues are present, communication can permit bargainers to exploit differences in preferences in designing agreements that beat other alternatives.
|
| 9 |
,Distrust, Limited Resources, and Uncertainty, |
Timothy J. Sullivan |
|
Abstract
In searching for a constructive resolution to conflict, it is natural to focus on the chief actors in a dispute, the issues that divide them, and the settings in which they interact. Generally, disputes cannot end until some form of resolution is reached between the principal disputing groups on the main issues. Discussing underlying interests and discovering alternatives that offer gains to all depend on having a knowledge of interests and facts that usually only the groups and actors in a dispute possess.
|
| 10 |
,The Exercise of Negotiator and Mediator Discretion, |
Timothy J. Sullivan |
|
Abstract
This book began with a description of the problems generated by the bureaucratic and adversarial processes now used to review proposed development projects. Even when a project produces net benefits, a local community will often bear costs that outweigh its share of total benefits (O’Hare, 1977). When communities and individuals express opposition through administrative and judicial challenges, their actions can block needed and beneficial projects. Often opponents of a project challenge the adequacy of an environmental impact statement (Bardach and Pugliaresi, 1977; Frieden, 1979) and demand a fuller consideration of alternative sites.
|
| 11 |
,Necessary Elements for Mediation, |
Timothy J. Sullivan |
|
Abstract
In the best of all circumstances, negotiation and mediation can enable disputants to resolve disputes by finding consensus. At other times, only difficult compromises may make a negotiated settlement possible. In either case, a mediation process may offer a particularly attractive and productive alternative to destructively adversarial modes of decision-making. Mediation and negotiation, however, cannot resolve all disputes. In the worst cases, failure to successfully conclude a negotiation or mediation effort can actually complicate the conflict situation or lead to higher levels of destructive interaction. In addition, the disputants may blame the mediator for both the escalation of conflict and the failure of negotiations.
|
| 12 |
,Using Negotiation and Mediation, |
Timothy J. Sullivan |
|
Abstract
This book has examined the uses of negotiation and explored its potential as an alternative to adjudicatory proceedings for resolving disputes over development projects. Currently, ad-hoc negotiation with mediation offers an alternative that has successfully supplemented traditional administrative and bureaucratic forms of dispute resolution in disputes over development projects. The successes of these initial efforts and the enthusiastic reception of this technique by dispute participants suggest that negotiation has a good potential in these disputes.
|
| 13 |
,Conclusion: Prospects for Negotiation, |
Timothy J. Sullivan |
|
Abstract
As this book has discussed the advantages of resolving disputes over development projects through negotiations, it has raised a large number of cautions. Negotiations could become a series of hurdles that entrap developers in endless discussions. It is difficult to determine who should participate, what rights they have, and what constitutes an appropriate agenda. International experience warns that treaties and agreements do not insure that promises will be kept. Domestic labor-management experience indicates that even with the support of law and government, human interaction can turn bitter, adversarial, and destructive.
|
| 14 |
Back Matter |
|
|
Abstract
|
|
|
|Archiver|手机版|小黑屋|
派博传思国际
( 京公网安备110108008328)
GMT+8, 2025-7-13 05:27
发表于 2025-3-21 17:03:03
