| 书目名称 | Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept | | 编辑 | Eric Damme | | 视频video | | | 丛书名称 | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems | | 图书封面 |  | | 描述 | In this monograph, noncooperative games are studied. Since in a noncooperative game binding agreements are not possible, the solution of such a game has to be self enforcing, i. e. a Nash equilibrium (NASH [1950,1951J). In general, however, a game may possess many equilibria and so the problem arises which one of these should be chosen as the solution. It was first pointed out explicitly in SELTEN [1965J that I not all Nash equilibria of an extensive form game are qualified to be selected as the solution, since an equilibrium may prescribe irrational behavior at unreached parts of the game tree. Moreover, also for normal form games not all Nash equilibria are eligible, since an equilibrium need not be robust with respect to slight perturba tions in the data of the game. These observations lead to the conclusion that the Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined in order to obtain sensible solutions for every game. In the monograph, various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept are studied. Some of these have been proposed in the literature, but others are presented here for the first time. The objective is to study the relations between these refine ments;to derive charac | | 出版日期 | Book 1983 | | 关键词 | Nash-Gleichgewicht; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; dynamic programming; equilibrium; game theory; incomplete in | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-49970-8 | | isbn_softcover | 978-3-540-12690-4 | | isbn_ebook | 978-3-642-49970-8Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957 | | issn_series | 0075-8442 | | copyright | Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1983 |
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发表于 2025-3-21 19:36:00
