Titlebook: R & D, Innovation and Industrial Structure; Essays on the Theory Boris Maurer Book 1996 Physica-Verlag Heidelberg 1996 Forschung und Entwic

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Boris Maurerral register, the agency in charge of the election, the procedure for casting votes, and the procedure to sort out the winners and losers. Clearly, all these topics are fundamental for regulating the democratic course of an election. However, it is on the last two dimensions that the study of electo

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1431-1933 nfluence the state of competition in an industry by providing additional profit op­ portunities, etc. The same is true for exogenous changes in upstream markets978-3-7908-0900-8978-3-642-95925-7Series ISSN 1431-1933 Series E-ISSN 2197-7178

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Strategic Use of Delay and Secrecy for Rent Protection in Technological Competition,ersion of the stopping game introduced in the last chapter. The quality or technological standard of the innovation is given, but an additional source of uncertainty is introduced. In the setting discussed below, firms have incomplete information about the productiveness of the research technology that is used in the industry.

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1431-1933 is interaction technological competition. Firms invest into R&D in order to open up new or enlarge existing profit opportuni­ ties for the future. A successful R&D-project leads to an innovation. An innovation introduced into the market changes the competitive structure of the industry. At the same

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Sequential Innovative Entry and Endogenous Technology Choice,amework of Lippman and Mamer [1993]. In addition to the endogenization of technological standards chosen by firms under competition, I allow for sequential entry into the market. The entry times are freely chosen by the firms. With this generalization I obtain different classes of games of technolog