| 书目名称 | Psychiatry and Neuroscience Update | | 副标题 | From Epistemology to | | 编辑 | Pascual Ángel Gargiulo,Humberto Luis Mesones Arroy | | 视频video | http://file.papertrans.cn/763/762702/762702.mp4 | | 概述 | Provides an overview of recent intellectual and scientific advances that intersect psychiatry and neuroscience.Includes a varying panel of international experts identifies the borders, trends and impl | | 图书封面 |  | | 描述 | .This broad and thought-provoking volume provides an overview of recent intellectual and scientific advances that intersect psychiatry and neuroscience, offering a wide range of penetrating insights in both disciplines. The fourth volume on the topic in the last several years from a varying panel of international experts identifies the borders, trends and implications in both fields today and goes beyond that into related disciplines to seek out connections and influences. Similar to its three Update book predecessors, .Psychiatry and Neuroscience – Volume IV. presents a range of interesting topics in the main disciplines – psychiatry and neuroscience – and attempts to provide deeper comprehension or explication of the normal and diseased human mind, its biological correlates and its biographical and existential implications. This engaging volume continues the previous style of exploring different disciplines and trying to integrate disciplinary evidence from varying points of view in an organic manner. ..The first section is about epistemological considerations regarding the study of normal and abnormal human behaviors, including, for example, the topic of phenomenological ps | | 出版日期 | Book 2021 | | 关键词 | Psychiatry; neuroscience; neurology; biology; epistemology; pathology | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61721-9 | | isbn_softcover | 978-3-030-61723-3 | | isbn_ebook | 978-3-030-61721-9 | | copyright | Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 |
| 1 |
Psychiatry and the Inference to the Best Explanation |
Juan Ernesto Calderón |
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Abstract
Critical rationalism sustains that the best way to evaluate scientific theories is through the hypothetico-deductive method. Hypotheses are tested deducing the observational consequences from them. Falsifying hypotheses is science’s task, which implies proposing hypotheses able to surpass the previous ones in their explanatory content and precision. However, according to the Duhem-Quine hypothesis, it is impossible to falsify a hypothesis in a conclusive way. For this reason, several authors affirm that the Popperian demarcation criterion is not valid in Psychiatry and propose to save/rescue the clinical results without using the categories of the Philosophy of Science. To solve this problem, the key is to look for another method which offers enough epistemic strength and which is enlarging at the same time. The difficulties found in Falsacionism can be overcome using the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). In the case of Psychiatry, the IBE is a tool which allows to explain research and clinical practice and also to enquire into the so-called Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM). The EBM is a way of medical practice which has had a great impact and which is strongly questioned nowadays. These questioning stem from the fact that the EBM is not placed inside a method which permits to understand the rationality of practice, even though this rationality of practice can, in fact, be explained by the IBE.
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| 2 |
Psychiatry and the Inference to the Best Explanation |
Juan Ernesto Calderón |
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Abstract
Critical rationalism sustains that the best way to evaluate scientific theories is through the hypothetico-deductive method. Hypotheses are tested deducing the observational consequences from them. Falsifying hypotheses is science’s task, which implies proposing hypotheses able to surpass the previous ones in their explanatory content and precision. However, according to the Duhem-Quine hypothesis, it is impossible to falsify a hypothesis in a conclusive way. For this reason, several authors affirm that the Popperian demarcation criterion is not valid in Psychiatry and propose to save/rescue the clinical results without using the categories of the Philosophy of Science. To solve this problem, the key is to look for another method which offers enough epistemic strength and which is enlarging at the same time. The difficulties found in Falsacionism can be overcome using the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). In the case of Psychiatry, the IBE is a tool which allows to explain research and clinical practice and also to enquire into the so-called Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM). The EBM is a way of medical practice which has had a great impact and which is strongly questioned nowadays. These questioning stem from the fact that the EBM is not placed inside a method which permits to understand the rationality of practice, even though this rationality of practice can, in fact, be explained by the IBE.
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| 3 |
The Notion of Empathy According to Edith Stein |
Miriam Dolly Arancibia |
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Abstract
The doctoral thesis of Edith Stein focuses on the problem of empathy. The main problem is the question of empathy as experience of foreign subjects and their experiences. The complete work contains a strictly historical exhibition of previously studied problems: the aesthetic empathy, empathy as a source of knowledge of the experience of others, and empathy ethics. Stein realized that these problems appeared mixed and both not separated: in the theoretical knowledge aspect and in the descriptive and psychogenetic aspects of the problems in question. In that mix, Stein found the reason why those problems had yet unresolved. Unfortunately, this first part is probably lost. In the second part outlined the essence of the concept of empathy discussing with Theodor Lipps and Max Scheler. In the third and fourth parts, the more systematic, Stein treated the problem of the constitution of the individual psychophysical and empathy as understanding of spiritual persons..According to Stein, the problem is that the traditional philosophical speech was dedicated to pure “I” and to subject of experience but not necessarily to another. Nevertheless, that is one of the central interests of Stein in dealing with the problem of empathy..The objective of this article focuses on the empathy as comprehension of spiritual persons. Specifically, it pursues to elucidate the conditions of possibility of empathy between people according to Edith Stein.
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| 4 |
The Notion of Empathy According to Edith Stein |
Miriam Dolly Arancibia |
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Abstract
The doctoral thesis of Edith Stein focuses on the problem of empathy. The main problem is the question of empathy as experience of foreign subjects and their experiences. The complete work contains a strictly historical exhibition of previously studied problems: the aesthetic empathy, empathy as a source of knowledge of the experience of others, and empathy ethics. Stein realized that these problems appeared mixed and both not separated: in the theoretical knowledge aspect and in the descriptive and psychogenetic aspects of the problems in question. In that mix, Stein found the reason why those problems had yet unresolved. Unfortunately, this first part is probably lost. In the second part outlined the essence of the concept of empathy discussing with Theodor Lipps and Max Scheler. In the third and fourth parts, the more systematic, Stein treated the problem of the constitution of the individual psychophysical and empathy as understanding of spiritual persons..According to Stein, the problem is that the traditional philosophical speech was dedicated to pure “I” and to subject of experience but not necessarily to another. Nevertheless, that is one of the central interests of Stein in dealing with the problem of empathy..The objective of this article focuses on the empathy as comprehension of spiritual persons. Specifically, it pursues to elucidate the conditions of possibility of empathy between people according to Edith Stein.
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| 5 |
Coincidence with One’s Self |
Ricardo Aranovich |
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Abstract
Ortega y Gasset says that “The substantial, original and, in that sense unique problem is fitting me . myself, agreeing with myself, finding myself” (Ortega y Gasset, José, Complete Works, Ed. Taurus, Madrid 2004 (in advance CW), Volume (V). VI, p. 437) and adds: “And that, fitting in oneself, is the definition of happiness” (Ortega y Gasset, José, CW, V. VI, p. 439). Another way to say the same thing would be to say that the human being gets close to happiness, the unrenounceable goal of life, as it searches unity with itself and through facing the difficulties of its circumstance achieves staying integrated, as the alternatives of existence do not push it away from its life project. The accomplishment and maintenance of that unity is the function of the spirit, understood as the capacity of preserving and order and mental equilibrium through and above all events. This capacity is inherent to the human being; without it, humanity would not have survived. But the current culture, with its emphasis in external accomplishments, neglects that capacity, while its lifestyle makes it all the more necessary. Humanity faces here an evolutionary challenge. It must find a way to restore its internal equilibrium without losing and even improving its capacity of acting. The epidemic rise of stress-related diseases, anxiety disorders, and depression would be the manifestation of a cultural failure and its consequences, derived to medicine.
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| 6 |
Coincidence with One’s Self |
Ricardo Aranovich |
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Abstract
Ortega y Gasset says that “The substantial, original and, in that sense unique problem is fitting me . myself, agreeing with myself, finding myself” (Ortega y Gasset, José, Complete Works, Ed. Taurus, Madrid 2004 (in advance CW), Volume (V). VI, p. 437) and adds: “And that, fitting in oneself, is the definition of happiness” (Ortega y Gasset, José, CW, V. VI, p. 439). Another way to say the same thing would be to say that the human being gets close to happiness, the unrenounceable goal of life, as it searches unity with itself and through facing the difficulties of its circumstance achieves staying integrated, as the alternatives of existence do not push it away from its life project. The accomplishment and maintenance of that unity is the function of the spirit, understood as the capacity of preserving and order and mental equilibrium through and above all events. This capacity is inherent to the human being; without it, humanity would not have survived. But the current culture, with its emphasis in external accomplishments, neglects that capacity, while its lifestyle makes it all the more necessary. Humanity faces here an evolutionary challenge. It must find a way to restore its internal equilibrium without losing and even improving its capacity of acting. The epidemic rise of stress-related diseases, anxiety disorders, and depression would be the manifestation of a cultural failure and its consequences, derived to medicine.
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| 7 |
Naturalism, Psychology, and Culture: Nature vs. Nurture? |
Pascual Ángel Gargiulo,Ricardo Crespo |
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Abstract
In this proposal, the role of nature is compared with psychological or psychoreactive influences. In fact, throughout the centuries, a set of philosophical ideas, a “metaphysical worldview,” has greatly influenced our conceptions of life and science. The beliefs that prevail today in the world make up a naturalistic worldview, in the narrow sense of the term that ultimately reduces the objects of knowledge to nature, to physical and biological things and processes (.). This context takes a perspective on evolutionary psychology and its possible role trying to “explain” the entire human condition. Science is equated with natural science, arguing that its methods are applicable to the “explanation” of any reality. This constitutes a methodological naturalism. This knowledge, which arises from the observation of the inconsistencies of a naturalistic approach to the biographical, to the human in the strict sense, is raised here in a historical way. Here the relevance of the application of naturalistic methods is discussed. The first limitations observed regarding to these methods are developed here in a successive manner. The contributions of the incipient “experimental psychology” are highlighted and weighted here. Finally, “experiential conditioning” and “motivation” are conceptually separated from “causal explanations” in the field of human behavior. The role of biological causes and intentional motivation are compared.
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| 8 |
Naturalism, Psychology, and Culture: Nature vs. Nurture? |
Pascual Ángel Gargiulo,Ricardo Crespo |
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Abstract
In this proposal, the role of nature is compared with psychological or psychoreactive influences. In fact, throughout the centuries, a set of philosophical ideas, a “metaphysical worldview,” has greatly influenced our conceptions of life and science. The beliefs that prevail today in the world make up a naturalistic worldview, in the narrow sense of the term that ultimately reduces the objects of knowledge to nature, to physical and biological things and processes (.). This context takes a perspective on evolutionary psychology and its possible role trying to “explain” the entire human condition. Science is equated with natural science, arguing that its methods are applicable to the “explanation” of any reality. This constitutes a methodological naturalism. This knowledge, which arises from the observation of the inconsistencies of a naturalistic approach to the biographical, to the human in the strict sense, is raised here in a historical way. Here the relevance of the application of naturalistic methods is discussed. The first limitations observed regarding to these methods are developed here in a successive manner. The contributions of the incipient “experimental psychology” are highlighted and weighted here. Finally, “experiential conditioning” and “motivation” are conceptually separated from “causal explanations” in the field of human behavior. The role of biological causes and intentional motivation are compared.
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| 9 |
The Self-Organized Feedback Brain |
Osvaldo Agamennoni |
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Abstract
The brain’s main cognitive capacity has been developed, during evolution, to interact with the environment. As individual beings, integrated into a network of similar beings, we continuously perceive our environment, and, at the same time, we act on it. In this way, we generate actions that could modify it and therefore change the messages others perceive. In this action-perception loop, also known as cognitive cycle, are continuously involved attention, memory, and prediction, among other processing information tasks. Then, it is clear that an approach to deeply understand the functionalities of the brain requires a dynamic systemic point of view. In this sense, many different researchers have used the control theory framework to study the human behavior. The Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) is one of these approaches which was presented by Powers in the 1970s to help to comprehend the causes, maintenance, and treatment of psychological disorders. Closer in time, self-organization theories have shown that can be useful to explain significant aspects of developmental neuroscience, providing strong evidences in favor of self-organized mechanisms in the brain. In the present chapter, special attention is paid to use feedback control and self-organizing theory approaches to understand the dynamic features of the brain related to behavior at the individual level as well as social.
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| 10 |
The Self-Organized Feedback Brain |
Osvaldo Agamennoni |
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Abstract
The brain’s main cognitive capacity has been developed, during evolution, to interact with the environment. As individual beings, integrated into a network of similar beings, we continuously perceive our environment, and, at the same time, we act on it. In this way, we generate actions that could modify it and therefore change the messages others perceive. In this action-perception loop, also known as cognitive cycle, are continuously involved attention, memory, and prediction, among other processing information tasks. Then, it is clear that an approach to deeply understand the functionalities of the brain requires a dynamic systemic point of view. In this sense, many different researchers have used the control theory framework to study the human behavior. The Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) is one of these approaches which was presented by Powers in the 1970s to help to comprehend the causes, maintenance, and treatment of psychological disorders. Closer in time, self-organization theories have shown that can be useful to explain significant aspects of developmental neuroscience, providing strong evidences in favor of self-organized mechanisms in the brain. In the present chapter, special attention is paid to use feedback control and self-organizing theory approaches to understand the dynamic features of the brain related to behavior at the individual level as well as social.
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| 11 |
,, the Object of a Philosophical Medicine: An Epistemological Analysis of the Treatise , |
María Teresa Gargiulo |
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Abstract
In this study, we propose to analyze the concept of . in the treatise . that is part of the Corpus Hippocraticum. We will study it inasmuch as it constitutes a core concept on which a particular epistemological relationship between philosophy and medicine is resolved. There is an extensive hermeneutical tradition that presents this writing as the birth of a scientific medicine detached from all kinds of philosophical reflection. For the author of the letter would seem to behave like an empiricist who seeks as a doctor to get radically rid of philosophy or, at least, that ancient medicine that founds his medical practice in the philosophical theory of the elements. However, despite the partial success of this interpretive tradition, we believe that it runs the risk of offering a fragmentary and incomplete reading of the new epistemological statute that the author seeks to assign to medicine. In our opinion, the author, far from trying to expel the philosophy of practice and medical research, integrates it into a new model of scientific explanation.
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| 12 |
,, the Object of a Philosophical Medicine: An Epistemological Analysis of the Treatise , |
María Teresa Gargiulo |
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Abstract
In this study, we propose to analyze the concept of . in the treatise . that is part of the Corpus Hippocraticum. We will study it inasmuch as it constitutes a core concept on which a particular epistemological relationship between philosophy and medicine is resolved. There is an extensive hermeneutical tradition that presents this writing as the birth of a scientific medicine detached from all kinds of philosophical reflection. For the author of the letter would seem to behave like an empiricist who seeks as a doctor to get radically rid of philosophy or, at least, that ancient medicine that founds his medical practice in the philosophical theory of the elements. However, despite the partial success of this interpretive tradition, we believe that it runs the risk of offering a fragmentary and incomplete reading of the new epistemological statute that the author seeks to assign to medicine. In our opinion, the author, far from trying to expel the philosophy of practice and medical research, integrates it into a new model of scientific explanation.
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| 13 |
Inserted Thoughts and the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness |
Rocco J. Gennaro |
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Abstract
Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about . mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “. am in mental state M” (Rosenthal D. Consciousness and mind. New York: Oxford University Press; 2005, Gennaro R. The consciousness paradox: consciousness, concepts, and higher-order thoughts. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press; 2012. p. 127–9.). In a previous publication (Gennaro R. Somatoparaphrenia, anosognosia, and higher-order thoughts. In: Gennaro R, editor. Disturbed consciousness: new essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press; 2015. p. 57–8), I argued that a HOT theorist can adequately respond to this concern with respect to somatoparaphrenia. Somatoparaphrenia is a “depersonalization disorder” which is characterized by the sense of alienation from parts of one’s body. It is a bizarre type of body delusion where one denies ownership of a limb or an entire side of one’s body. My focus in the chapter, however, is on “inserted thoughts” which is a common symptom of schizophrenia, although it will also be useful to contrast it with somatoparaphrenia. Schizophrenia is a mental disorder which most commonly manifests itself through auditory hallucinations, paranoid or bizarre delusions, or disorganized speech and thinking. Thought insertion is the delusion that some thoughts are not “one’s own” in some sense or are somehow being inserted into one’s mind by someone else. Graham and Stephens (When self-consciousness breaks: alien voices and inserted thoughts. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press; 2000), for example, have suggested that thought insertion should be understood as .. I argue that HOT theory has nothing to fear from this phenomenon either and can consistently explain what happens in this admittedly unusual case.
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| 14 |
Inserted Thoughts and the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness |
Rocco J. Gennaro |
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Abstract
Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about . mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “. am in mental state M” (Rosenthal D. Consciousness and mind. New York: Oxford University Press; 2005, Gennaro R. The consciousness paradox: consciousness, concepts, and higher-order thoughts. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press; 2012. p. 127–9.). In a previous publication (Gennaro R. Somatoparaphrenia, anosognosia, and higher-order thoughts. In: Gennaro R, editor. Disturbed consciousness: new essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press; 2015. p. 57–8), I argued that a HOT theorist can adequately respond to this concern with respect to somatoparaphrenia. Somatoparaphrenia is a “depersonalization disorder” which is characterized by the sense of alienation from parts of one’s body. It is a bizarre type of body delusion where one denies ownership of a limb or an entire side of one’s body. My focus in the chapter, however, is on “inserted thoughts” which is a common symptom of schizophrenia, although it will also be useful to contrast it with somatoparaphrenia. Schizophrenia is a mental disorder which most commonly manifests itself through auditory hallucinations, paranoid or bizarre delusions, or disorganized speech and thinking. Thought insertion is the delusion that some thoughts are not “one’s own” in some sense or are somehow being inserted into one’s mind by someone else. Graham and Stephens (When self-consciousness breaks: alien voices and inserted thoughts. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press; 2000), for example, have suggested that thought insertion should be understood as .. I argue that HOT theory has nothing to fear from this phenomenon either and can consistently explain what happens in this admittedly unusual case.
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| 15 |
Relationship Between Body and Soul According to Saint Thomas: An Obsolete Issue? |
Francisco Rego |
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Abstract
In spite of the opinion of materialistic thinkers, from ancient times, the soul was understood as the principle of life, and far from restricting its activity to purely vegetative and sentient functions, it was extended to the rational field as well. For better understanding, see what happens to a tree leaf, when at the end of its cycle of life, it falls and changes color from bright green to grey and turns brittle. It happens because it is a leaf deprived of life. And the same thing happens with the human body when it stops having the vital impulse of its own soul, initiating an irreversible corruption process. This is a point of view that gives way to the reasonableness of the human existence and to the justification of the question because of the relationship that soul and body have between them. Said briefly, the soul, although not understood as a sensitive reality, does not have to be considered as a nonexistent or mythological reality but also as a real order that links to the body as substantial formal essential principle. It determines the body in the order of being and the way of being, that is, the soul makes man to be and to be what he is and, at the same time, enlivens him and founds all his spiritual and organic activities.
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| 16 |
Relationship Between Body and Soul According to Saint Thomas: An Obsolete Issue? |
Francisco Rego |
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Abstract
In spite of the opinion of materialistic thinkers, from ancient times, the soul was understood as the principle of life, and far from restricting its activity to purely vegetative and sentient functions, it was extended to the rational field as well. For better understanding, see what happens to a tree leaf, when at the end of its cycle of life, it falls and changes color from bright green to grey and turns brittle. It happens because it is a leaf deprived of life. And the same thing happens with the human body when it stops having the vital impulse of its own soul, initiating an irreversible corruption process. This is a point of view that gives way to the reasonableness of the human existence and to the justification of the question because of the relationship that soul and body have between them. Said briefly, the soul, although not understood as a sensitive reality, does not have to be considered as a nonexistent or mythological reality but also as a real order that links to the body as substantial formal essential principle. It determines the body in the order of being and the way of being, that is, the soul makes man to be and to be what he is and, at the same time, enlivens him and founds all his spiritual and organic activities.
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| 17 |
The Conception of Psychosomatic Medicine in Spain: From Neurology to the Person |
Consuelo Martínez Priego |
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Abstract
As natural medicine dwindled toward the end of the nineteenth century, new perspectives emerged enabling science to deal with why a person becomes ill. This change took place in view of the presence of a scientific, philosophical, and cultural .. Psychoanalysis, philosophical anthropology, and particularly the expansion of neurology played a unique role: these fields include a human social dimension and attempt to overcome the corporal mechanicism passed down by Descartes, as well as dualism, a causal structure between the psychic and the somatic. In Spain, the physician Juan Rof Carballo (1905–1994) became the father of psychosomatic medicine due to his university education, teachers, open mindedness, and interest in everything human, allowing him to witness these new ways of thinking about the person and also the ill person. He published . (1949) together with other important works such as . (1952). The key concept of his proposal is the affective warp. This chapter analyzes the various sources that make up the psychosomatic perspective, emphasizing the role played by neurology and “the constitutive process” of man (Rof Carballo uses the term “man” in a generic sense). To justify the selection of this author, bibliometric data were used. This study, centered on a historical perspective, attempts to shed light on the present, in which neuroscientific advances and the humanization of medicine do not always share the same fate.
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| 18 |
The Conception of Psychosomatic Medicine in Spain: From Neurology to the Person |
Consuelo Martínez Priego |
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Abstract
As natural medicine dwindled toward the end of the nineteenth century, new perspectives emerged enabling science to deal with why a person becomes ill. This change took place in view of the presence of a scientific, philosophical, and cultural .. Psychoanalysis, philosophical anthropology, and particularly the expansion of neurology played a unique role: these fields include a human social dimension and attempt to overcome the corporal mechanicism passed down by Descartes, as well as dualism, a causal structure between the psychic and the somatic. In Spain, the physician Juan Rof Carballo (1905–1994) became the father of psychosomatic medicine due to his university education, teachers, open mindedness, and interest in everything human, allowing him to witness these new ways of thinking about the person and also the ill person. He published . (1949) together with other important works such as . (1952). The key concept of his proposal is the affective warp. This chapter analyzes the various sources that make up the psychosomatic perspective, emphasizing the role played by neurology and “the constitutive process” of man (Rof Carballo uses the term “man” in a generic sense). To justify the selection of this author, bibliometric data were used. This study, centered on a historical perspective, attempts to shed light on the present, in which neuroscientific advances and the humanization of medicine do not always share the same fate.
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| 19 |
From Phenomenological Psychopathology to Phenomenological Psychiatry: The Cases of Schizophrenia and Substance Misuse |
Guilherme Messas,Melissa Tamelini |
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Abstract
Phenomenological psychopathology is a body of scientific knowledge on which the clinical practice of psychiatry is based since the first decades of the twentieth century. Traditionally, phenomenological psychopathology is understood as a basic science of psychiatry, whose role is to describe the core features of the psychopathological experiences. In recent times, the frontiers of phenomenological psychopathology have expanded to the development of therapeutic strategies that target the whole of existence in their actions. In this chapter, we will explore this new field of use of phenomenological psychopathology in psychiatry. We will present the rationale and the pragmatic use of a central concept of psychopathology, the notion of dialectic, highlighting the consequences of its use for clinical practice. The cases of schizophrenia and substance abuse will serve as models for this exposition. Regarding schizophrenia as a particular disturbance of aprioristic structures of consciousness, we suggest that the target for clinical care is to guarantee existential stability by giving prominence for corporeality. Concerning substance misuse, we propose that the aim of a clinical care is to help patients to avoid getting dominated by an excessive importance of the present dimension of the temporality. This conception of clinical care may effectively link modern psychiatry efforts to humanist approaches in psychopathology.
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| 20 |
From Phenomenological Psychopathology to Phenomenological Psychiatry: The Cases of Schizophrenia and Substance Misuse |
Guilherme Messas,Melissa Tamelini |
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Abstract
Phenomenological psychopathology is a body of scientific knowledge on which the clinical practice of psychiatry is based since the first decades of the twentieth century. Traditionally, phenomenological psychopathology is understood as a basic science of psychiatry, whose role is to describe the core features of the psychopathological experiences. In recent times, the frontiers of phenomenological psychopathology have expanded to the development of therapeutic strategies that target the whole of existence in their actions. In this chapter, we will explore this new field of use of phenomenological psychopathology in psychiatry. We will present the rationale and the pragmatic use of a central concept of psychopathology, the notion of dialectic, highlighting the consequences of its use for clinical practice. The cases of schizophrenia and substance abuse will serve as models for this exposition. Regarding schizophrenia as a particular disturbance of aprioristic structures of consciousness, we suggest that the target for clinical care is to guarantee existential stability by giving prominence for corporeality. Concerning substance misuse, we propose that the aim of a clinical care is to help patients to avoid getting dominated by an excessive importance of the present dimension of the temporality. This conception of clinical care may effectively link modern psychiatry efforts to humanist approaches in psychopathology.
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| 21 |
The Notion of Person in Neuroscience: From Cognitivism to a Comprehensive Phenomenology |
Javier Bernacer,Francisco Güell |
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Abstract
The attribution of the category of person to a living being is not irrelevant at all, since it indicates who is entitled to rights, dignity, and duties by law. Throughout approximately 15 centuries, since Boethius first defined the term, the most influential philosophers have provided an interpretation on which are the defining features of persons. Current neuroscience, influenced by mainstream utilitarian bioethics, takes John Locke’s definition of person as starting point: the being with intelligence, self-consciousness, and memory. This notion has been subsequently refined by analytic philosophy and contemporary thinkers such as Daniel Dennett, ending up in a cognitivist conception of person. In this text, we will discuss how current neuroscience has embraced this definition and the subsequent reductionism it leads to. In fact, for some authors, personhood is an illusion held by human beings. We will present other philosophical perspectives on the issue and will concentrate on the phenomenological interpretation to achieve a comprehensive notion of person. From this perspective, the person is understood as an embodied mind where the role of the environment, including interpersonal relationships, is utterly radical. This vision presupposes the inability of neuroscience, or any other individual discipline, to cover by itself what a person is. Thus, the phenomenological approach on the person is presented as a paradigmatic example to promote dialogue between scientific and humanistic disciplines.
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| 22 |
The Notion of Person in Neuroscience: From Cognitivism to a Comprehensive Phenomenology |
Javier Bernacer,Francisco Güell |
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Abstract
The attribution of the category of person to a living being is not irrelevant at all, since it indicates who is entitled to rights, dignity, and duties by law. Throughout approximately 15 centuries, since Boethius first defined the term, the most influential philosophers have provided an interpretation on which are the defining features of persons. Current neuroscience, influenced by mainstream utilitarian bioethics, takes John Locke’s definition of person as starting point: the being with intelligence, self-consciousness, and memory. This notion has been subsequently refined by analytic philosophy and contemporary thinkers such as Daniel Dennett, ending up in a cognitivist conception of person. In this text, we will discuss how current neuroscience has embraced this definition and the subsequent reductionism it leads to. In fact, for some authors, personhood is an illusion held by human beings. We will present other philosophical perspectives on the issue and will concentrate on the phenomenological interpretation to achieve a comprehensive notion of person. From this perspective, the person is understood as an embodied mind where the role of the environment, including interpersonal relationships, is utterly radical. This vision presupposes the inability of neuroscience, or any other individual discipline, to cover by itself what a person is. Thus, the phenomenological approach on the person is presented as a paradigmatic example to promote dialogue between scientific and humanistic disciplines.
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| 23 |
The Neuroethics of Beauty: Insights from Aldous Huxley’s Theory of Knowledge |
Luis Enrique Echarte Alonso |
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Abstract
In this chapter, I delve into the role of beauty in the understanding of human behavior, and, to carry this out, I will present some of Huxley’s ideas about science and art relationship. More specifically, I will show that, for Huxley, science is not a matter of simple curiosity or practical interest, but of demanding love. In other words, facing reality implies the development of human sensitivity, that is to say, the capacity to be aware of other’s needs and anticipate their demands. Similarly, for Huxley, interdisciplinary attitudes, which are inherent to scientific progress, are explained by a long chain of teleological natural dynamism (cosmic harmony) that brings researchers together. In this methodological framework, I analyze and compare two Huxley’s distinctions: on one hand, knowledge and understanding, and on the other hand, emotions and beauty. In my conclusions, I defend that Huxley’s notions of . and . are not fully accessible to neuroscience, but still they are essential to orientate neuroscience toward the study of human decision-making process.
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| 24 |
The Neuroethics of Beauty: Insights from Aldous Huxley’s Theory of Knowledge |
Luis Enrique Echarte Alonso |
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Abstract
In this chapter, I delve into the role of beauty in the understanding of human behavior, and, to carry this out, I will present some of Huxley’s ideas about science and art relationship. More specifically, I will show that, for Huxley, science is not a matter of simple curiosity or practical interest, but of demanding love. In other words, facing reality implies the development of human sensitivity, that is to say, the capacity to be aware of other’s needs and anticipate their demands. Similarly, for Huxley, interdisciplinary attitudes, which are inherent to scientific progress, are explained by a long chain of teleological natural dynamism (cosmic harmony) that brings researchers together. In this methodological framework, I analyze and compare two Huxley’s distinctions: on one hand, knowledge and understanding, and on the other hand, emotions and beauty. In my conclusions, I defend that Huxley’s notions of . and . are not fully accessible to neuroscience, but still they are essential to orientate neuroscience toward the study of human decision-making process.
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| 25 |
Radical Solutions to the Ontological and Epistemological Problems of Consciousness |
Javier Andrés García Castro |
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Abstract
The problem of consciousness is one of the first that most intimately concerns man, though it was the last to be approached by science. It is possible that the mystery of consciousness is that in order to be explained, it is necessary to face very diverse and complex issues. It is the purpose of this chapter to review the main problems that hinder the study of consciousness, the approaches from which the various disciplines have approached it, and the most radical and groundbreaking solutions that have been found. For this, a journey is carried out through three fundamental difficulties: the problem of reality, the problem of dualism, and the problem of the subjective quality of experience, as radical solutions to each of these problems are the conscious realism of Donald Hoffman, the model of the objective orchestrated reduction of Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff, the principle of synchronicity of Carl G. Jung, the new consciousness-collapse of the wave function model of David Chalmers, and the neurophenomenology of Francisco Varela. We conclude by highlighting the intrinsic difficulty in objectifying the phenomenon of consciousness, the state of immature science reflected in the apparent antagonism of theoretical proposals, and, finally, that the progressive integration and complementarity between some theoretical approaches could yield results in a promising paradigm shift which would allow further progress in clarifying the ontological and epistemological foundations of consciousness.
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| 26 |
Radical Solutions to the Ontological and Epistemological Problems of Consciousness |
Javier Andrés García Castro |
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Abstract
The problem of consciousness is one of the first that most intimately concerns man, though it was the last to be approached by science. It is possible that the mystery of consciousness is that in order to be explained, it is necessary to face very diverse and complex issues. It is the purpose of this chapter to review the main problems that hinder the study of consciousness, the approaches from which the various disciplines have approached it, and the most radical and groundbreaking solutions that have been found. For this, a journey is carried out through three fundamental difficulties: the problem of reality, the problem of dualism, and the problem of the subjective quality of experience, as radical solutions to each of these problems are the conscious realism of Donald Hoffman, the model of the objective orchestrated reduction of Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff, the principle of synchronicity of Carl G. Jung, the new consciousness-collapse of the wave function model of David Chalmers, and the neurophenomenology of Francisco Varela. We conclude by highlighting the intrinsic difficulty in objectifying the phenomenon of consciousness, the state of immature science reflected in the apparent antagonism of theoretical proposals, and, finally, that the progressive integration and complementarity between some theoretical approaches could yield results in a promising paradigm shift which would allow further progress in clarifying the ontological and epistemological foundations of consciousness.
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| 27 |
A Discussion of Anxiety Over the Last Millennium (1000 to 2000) |
Michel Bourin,Monique Bourin |
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Abstract
The scope of this chapter is a comparison between forms of anxiety present in advanced societies and those that were present around the year 1000. The year 1000 has been described as a time with intense fear of apocalypse. this theory is disputed today. But, even if the documentory sources are rare and difficult to interpret, the interest reamains to wonder, by comparing them to the current forms, to th anxiety in the medieval world where one often dies young and where hunger is a permanent risk.
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| 28 |
A Discussion of Anxiety Over the Last Millennium (1000 to 2000) |
Michel Bourin,Monique Bourin |
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Abstract
The scope of this chapter is a comparison between forms of anxiety present in advanced societies and those that were present around the year 1000. The year 1000 has been described as a time with intense fear of apocalypse. this theory is disputed today. But, even if the documentory sources are rare and difficult to interpret, the interest reamains to wonder, by comparing them to the current forms, to th anxiety in the medieval world where one often dies young and where hunger is a permanent risk.
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| 29 |
Neurotransmitters and Hormones in Human Decision-Making |
Luis Felipe Sarmiento Rivera,Amauri Gouveia |
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Abstract
Decision-making becomes an interdisciplinary process, which joints different fields such as neuroscience, psychology, and economy. It makes sense that decision-making has been studied in different ways and perspectives: economic decisions, related to cost and benefits of a decision; social decisions, involving social bonding, social behavior, and mating; and moral decisions that relates moral principles. This chapter aims to make an approach to the understanding of the molecular genetics, how genes, neurotransmitters, hormones, receptors, and enzymes are interacting, benefiting, or affecting different types of decision-making. This model exhibits a description relating oxytocin with moral decision-making, choosing the common well-being than the own well-being, also related to trustfulness in social decision-making. Arginine vasopressin (AVP) is linked to cooperation in social decision-making. Testosterone makes financial decision-making more risky. It is also connected with competitiveness and social dominance in social decision-making. Serotonin coupled with impulsivity affects social decisions and decision-making under risk and the value of harm in moral decisions. Stress hormones are linked to risky decisions, but just in men. Dopamine is affiliated with rewards and learning. It is typically associated with the valuation of the outcomes in the decisions. Finally, the model portrays the psychobiological interaction between all this hormones and neurotransmitters and their relationships to decision-making.
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| 30 |
Neurotransmitters and Hormones in Human Decision-Making |
Luis Felipe Sarmiento Rivera,Amauri Gouveia |
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Abstract
Decision-making becomes an interdisciplinary process, which joints different fields such as neuroscience, psychology, and economy. It makes sense that decision-making has been studied in different ways and perspectives: economic decisions, related to cost and benefits of a decision; social decisions, involving social bonding, social behavior, and mating; and moral decisions that relates moral principles. This chapter aims to make an approach to the understanding of the molecular genetics, how genes, neurotransmitters, hormones, receptors, and enzymes are interacting, benefiting, or affecting different types of decision-making. This model exhibits a description relating oxytocin with moral decision-making, choosing the common well-being than the own well-being, also related to trustfulness in social decision-making. Arginine vasopressin (AVP) is linked to cooperation in social decision-making. Testosterone makes financial decision-making more risky. It is also connected with competitiveness and social dominance in social decision-making. Serotonin coupled with impulsivity affects social decisions and decision-making under risk and the value of harm in moral decisions. Stress hormones are linked to risky decisions, but just in men. Dopamine is affiliated with rewards and learning. It is typically associated with the valuation of the outcomes in the decisions. Finally, the model portrays the psychobiological interaction between all this hormones and neurotransmitters and their relationships to decision-making.
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| 31 |
Glial Cells in the Schizophrenia Puzzle: Angiotensin II Role |
Victoria Belén Occhieppo,Osvaldo Martín Basmadjian,Natalia Andrea Marchese,Anahí Rodríguez,Andrea Jaime,Malena Herrera,Claudia Bregonzio |
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Abstract
Schizophrenia is a neuropsychiatric disease with 1% worldwide prevalence and characterized by a deep distortion in thought and perception, cognitive dysfunction, and social behavioral deficits. After the discovery of the antipsychotic effects of chlorpromazine, a large body of evidence pointed out to the neurotransmission misbalance as the main factor in the development of this pathology. Nowadays, it is known that schizophrenia is related to a pluri-factorial etiopathogenesis where gene factors, neuroinflammation, and brain microenvironment’s alterations are taken into account as well. In this sense, glial cells (oligodendrocytes, astrocytes, and microglial cells) are essential pieces in brain microenvironment with crucial roles in synaptic establishment and function, neuroinflammation, and metabolic and ion homeostasis, among others. Currently, glial cells are the target of numerous researches on the race to puzzle out the schizophrenia etiopathology..Among the multiplicity of regulatory substances involved in glial cell functionality, it becomes outstanding the newly described roles for brain angiotensin II (Ang II). This neuropeptide, through its AT. receptors (AT.-R), expressed in neurons and glial cells modulates brain homeostasis and several neurotransmission systems (dopaminergic, glutamatergic, and GABAergic) and has a pro-inflammatory role in pathological conditions. In this way, Ang II has been involved in cognition processes, stress responses, and mental disorders such as schizophrenia, addiction, Parkinson’s, and Alzheimer’s diseases..In this chapter, we aimed to summarize the role of the glial cells in the schizophrenia with a special reference to AT.-R involvement in this complex scenario.
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| 32 |
Glial Cells in the Schizophrenia Puzzle: Angiotensin II Role |
Victoria Belén Occhieppo,Osvaldo Martín Basmadjian,Natalia Andrea Marchese,Anahí Rodríguez,Andrea Jaime,Malena Herrera,Claudia Bregonzio |
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Abstract
Schizophrenia is a neuropsychiatric disease with 1% worldwide prevalence and characterized by a deep distortion in thought and perception, cognitive dysfunction, and social behavioral deficits. After the discovery of the antipsychotic effects of chlorpromazine, a large body of evidence pointed out to the neurotransmission misbalance as the main factor in the development of this pathology. Nowadays, it is known that schizophrenia is related to a pluri-factorial etiopathogenesis where gene factors, neuroinflammation, and brain microenvironment’s alterations are taken into account as well. In this sense, glial cells (oligodendrocytes, astrocytes, and microglial cells) are essential pieces in brain microenvironment with crucial roles in synaptic establishment and function, neuroinflammation, and metabolic and ion homeostasis, among others. Currently, glial cells are the target of numerous researches on the race to puzzle out the schizophrenia etiopathology..Among the multiplicity of regulatory substances involved in glial cell functionality, it becomes outstanding the newly described roles for brain angiotensin II (Ang II). This neuropeptide, through its AT. receptors (AT.-R), expressed in neurons and glial cells modulates brain homeostasis and several neurotransmission systems (dopaminergic, glutamatergic, and GABAergic) and has a pro-inflammatory role in pathological conditions. In this way, Ang II has been involved in cognition processes, stress responses, and mental disorders such as schizophrenia, addiction, Parkinson’s, and Alzheimer’s diseases..In this chapter, we aimed to summarize the role of the glial cells in the schizophrenia with a special reference to AT.-R involvement in this complex scenario.
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| 33 |
Somatostatin and Neurotensin Systems in Schizophrenia |
Andrea Induni,Fernando Gil Zbinden,María Graciela López Ordieres |
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Abstract
Schizophrenia is a complex mental disease characterized by a pathological alteration of several interacting neurotransmitter systems rather than a specific dysfunction of a single neurotransmitter system. It is well-known that knowledge of the schizophrenia pathophysiology has currently advanced beyond dopamine dysfunction to include glutamate, GABA, serotonin, and acetylcholine systems, which may be interacting with neuropeptide systems. Schizophrenic patients show alterations in several brain functions that regulate cognitive, affective, motor, and sensory processing. Cognitive deficits, associated with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex dysfunction, are the result of abnormalities in GABA neurotransmission. GABA interneurons that contain parvalbumin and somatostatin are reduced in individuals with schizophrenia. Somatostatin is a tetradecapeptide whose main action is to control the hypothalamus release of growth hormone. Its distribution throughout the central nervous system, mainly in the GABA neurons, means that it could be implicated in schizophrenia. Furthermore, neurotensin is a tridecapeptide closely related to dopamine transmission that produces biochemical and behavioral effects after central administration resembles those observed by a systemic administration of antipsychotic agents. In general, peptides do not cross the blood-brain barrier properly; thus somatostatin and neurotensin analogs were synthesized to resist enzymatic degradation and to achieve a better entry into the brain in the hope of producing central effects. Many central peptide systems may be involved in the physiopathology of the schizophrenia, but the purpose was to describe somatostatin and neurotensin actions and their relationships with different neurotransmission systems involved in the disease.
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| 34 |
Somatostatin and Neurotensin Systems in Schizophrenia |
Andrea Induni,Fernando Gil Zbinden,María Graciela López Ordieres |
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Abstract
Schizophrenia is a complex mental disease characterized by a pathological alteration of several interacting neurotransmitter systems rather than a specific dysfunction of a single neurotransmitter system. It is well-known that knowledge of the schizophrenia pathophysiology has currently advanced beyond dopamine dysfunction to include glutamate, GABA, serotonin, and acetylcholine systems, which may be interacting with neuropeptide systems. Schizophrenic patients show alterations in several brain functions that regulate cognitive, affective, motor, and sensory processing. Cognitive deficits, associated with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex dysfunction, are the result of abnormalities in GABA neurotransmission. GABA interneurons that contain parvalbumin and somatostatin are reduced in individuals with schizophrenia. Somatostatin is a tetradecapeptide whose main action is to control the hypothalamus release of growth hormone. Its distribution throughout the central nervous system, mainly in the GABA neurons, means that it could be implicated in schizophrenia. Furthermore, neurotensin is a tridecapeptide closely related to dopamine transmission that produces biochemical and behavioral effects after central administration resembles those observed by a systemic administration of antipsychotic agents. In general, peptides do not cross the blood-brain barrier properly; thus somatostatin and neurotensin analogs were synthesized to resist enzymatic degradation and to achieve a better entry into the brain in the hope of producing central effects. Many central peptide systems may be involved in the physiopathology of the schizophrenia, but the purpose was to describe somatostatin and neurotensin actions and their relationships with different neurotransmission systems involved in the disease.
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发表于 2025-3-21 17:00:51
