| 书目名称 | Physicalism and the Mind | | 编辑 | Robert Francescotti | | 视频video | | | 概述 | Addresses a tightly knit cluster of significant questions in the metaphysics of mind.Critiques accounts of realization by Melynk, Pereboom, and Shoemaker.Describes a sense in which mental properties q | | 丛书名称 | SpringerBriefs in Philosophy | | 图书封面 |  | | 描述 | .This book addresses a tightly knit cluster of questions in the philosophy of mind. There is the question: Are mental properties identical with physical properties? An affirmative answer would seem to secure the truth of .physicalism. regarding the mind, i.e., the belief that all mental phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. If the answer is negative, then the question arises: Can this .solely in virtue of. relation be understood as some kind of dependence short of identity? And answering this requires answering two further questions. Exactly what sort of dependence on the physical does physicalism require, and what is needed for a property or phenomenon to qualify as physical?. .It is argued that .multiple realizability. still provides irresistible proof (especially with the possibility of immaterial realizers) that mental properties are not identical with any properties of physics, chemistry, or biology. After refuting various attempts to formulate nonreductive physicalism with the notion of .realization., a new definition of physicalism is offered. This definition shows how it could be that the mental depends solely on the physical even if mental properties are | | 出版日期 | Book 2014 | | 关键词 | Melnyk; Pereboom; functional properties; functional roles; material constitution; mental properties; metap | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9451-0 | | isbn_softcover | 978-94-017-9450-3 | | isbn_ebook | 978-94-017-9451-0Series ISSN 2211-4548 Series E-ISSN 2211-4556 | | issn_series | 2211-4548 | | copyright | The Author(s) 2014 |
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发表于 2025-3-21 17:18:32
