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Titlebook: Optimal Control and Differential Games; Essays in Honor of S Georges Zaccour Book 2002 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002 design

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A Capital Accumulation Model with Debt Financing: The Steigum Model Revisitedssumed that it is more difficult for the firm to get a loan when the debt-equity ratio is large. Consequently it is imposed that the interest rate increases with this ratio. The model under consideration has been studied before by Steigum (1983, Econometrica). He obtained that the problem reduces to
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Turnpikes in Multi-Discount Rate Environments and Gcc Policy Evaluationetween two averaged discounted sums of the same stream of rewards. We show that the turnpike associated with the lowest discount rate is the one that will prevail. We also show that, when one discount rate is equal to 0, the problem of the best compromise between a discounted sum and the long term a
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Existence and Characterization of Time-Consistent Monetary Policy Rules-consistent if the central bank has no incentive to deviate from it, no matter what the actual output level of the economy is. Within a simple dynamic model combining an output-inflation trade-off with rational private-sector expectations we study existence and properties of time-consistent monetary
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Dynamic Oligopolistic Competition and Quasi-Competitive Behaviorlosses to society, they are the focus of regulatory and/or procompetitive actions. One popular action against oligopolistic markets structures is the provision of free access into these markets. In this paper we study the implications of free market entry on the equilibrium price in the industry. In
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Recent Studies on Incentive Design Problems in Game Theory and Management Scienceses result in an incentive compatible Pareto optimal outcome and the third process takes care of the agent’s individual rationality. We also discuss a negotiation process to achieve this outcome and give the wage contract an interpretation in terms of incentive equilibrium. This concept has recently
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