| 书目名称 | On the Physical Security of Physically Unclonable Functions |
| 编辑 | Shahin Tajik |
| 视频video | |
| 概述 | Investigates the susceptibility of intrinsic physically unclonable function (PUF) implementations to attacks from the chip backside.Demonstrates that the secrets generated by a PUF can be predicted, m |
| 丛书名称 | T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services |
| 图书封面 |  |
| 描述 | This book investigates the susceptibility of intrinsic physically unclonable function (PUF) implementations on reconfigurable hardware to optical semi-invasive attacks from the chip backside. It explores different classes of optical attacks, particularly photonic emission analysis, laser fault injection, and optical contactless probing. By applying these techniques, the book demonstrates that the secrets generated by a PUF can be predicted, manipulated or directly probed without affecting the behavior of the PUF. It subsequently discusses the cost and feasibility of launching such attacks against the very latest hardware technologies in a real scenario. The author discusses why PUFs are not tamper-evident in their current configuration, and therefore, PUFs alone cannot raise the security level of key storage. The author then reviews the potential and already implemented countermeasures, which can remedy PUFs’ security-related shortcomings and make them resistant to optical side-channeland optical fault attacks. Lastly, by making selected modifications to the functionality of an existing PUF architecture, the book presents a prototype tamper-evident sensor for detecting optical cont |
| 出版日期 | Book 2019 |
| 关键词 | Photonic Side-Channel Analysis; Laser Fault Injection; Optical Contactless Probing; tamper-evident sens |
| 版次 | 1 |
| doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75820-6 |
| isbn_softcover | 978-3-030-09333-4 |
| isbn_ebook | 978-3-319-75820-6Series ISSN 2192-2810 Series E-ISSN 2192-2829 |
| issn_series | 2192-2810 |
| copyright | Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 |
发表于 2025-3-21 19:53:02
