| 书目名称 | Non-Bayesian Decision Theory |
| 副标题 | Beliefs and Desires |
| 编辑 | Martin Peterson |
| 视频video | |
| 概述 | First non-Bayesian account of normative decision theory.Axiomatisation of expected utility principle does not rely on independence axiom.Includes a formal account of the framing of decision problems |
| 丛书名称 | Theory and Decision Library A: |
| 图书封面 |  |
| 描述 | For quite some time, philosophers, economists, and statisticians have endorsed a view on rational choice known as Bayesianism. The work on this book has grown out of a feeling that the Bayesian view has come to dominate the academic com- nitytosuchanextentthatalternative,non-Bayesianpositionsareseldomextensively researched. Needless to say, I think this is a pity. Non-Bayesian positions deserve to be examined with much greater care, and the present work is an attempt to defend what I believe to be a coherent and reasonably detailed non-Bayesian account of decision theory. The main thesis I defend can be summarised as follows. Rational agents m- imise subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, ut- ity and subjective probability should not be de?ned in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. On the contrary, rational decision makers need only consider preferences over certain outcomes. It will be shown that utility and probability fu- tions derived in a non-Bayesian manner can be used for generating preferences over uncertain prospects, that support the principle of maximising subjective expected utility. To some extent, this non-Bayesian view g |
| 出版日期 | Book 2008 |
| 关键词 | Bayesian; Independence axiom; Non-Bayesian Decision Theory; Utility Theory; decision theory; probability |
| 版次 | 1 |
| doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8699-1 |
| isbn_softcover | 978-90-481-7957-2 |
| isbn_ebook | 978-1-4020-8699-1Series ISSN 0921-3384 Series E-ISSN 2352-2119 |
| issn_series | 0921-3384 |
| copyright | Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008 |
发表于 2025-3-21 17:53:27
