Titlebook: New Essays on the Explanation of Action; Constantine Sandis Book 2009 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2009

nepotism

Reasons: Explanatory and Normatived one (Ds for a reason if one (Ds because, as one believes, there is a reason to (even if the belief is false); and (b) While all actions with a purpose or intention are intentional actions, not all intentional actions can sensibly be said to be actions done with an intention.

胆小鬼

CARK

傻瓜

Introductions of a growing stream of philosophers whose recent work has challenged some of the most popular ways of thinking about action and its explanation. While many of these dominant conceptions have roots in ancient, medieval, and early modern philosophy, their most direct inspiration is Donald Davidson’s

arcane

What Are Reasons for Action?desires could be the causes of, and not merely the reasons for, his actions. In more recent years, however, what has become more controversial is whether one can properly take an agent’s propositional attitudes to be reasons for his actions. There has been a growing trend amongst philosophers of act

conference

Was Sally’s Reason for Running from the Bear that She Thought it was Chasing Her?reason for running is that a bear is chasing her. But it also seems that her reason for running is that she . a bear is chasing her.. Indeed it is sometimes asserted that her real reason . be that a bear is chasing her, but must be merely that she thinks or believes that a bear is chasing her. For e

needle

promote

Reasons as Non-causal, Context-placing Explanationsverned causal relations between states, events or properties which ordinary mental terms are alleged to pick out or in causal relations between to-be-discovered realisers of those supposed states.. But this conception of the use of mental terms and of the kind of explanation they serve was disputed

ALB

合唱队

Can One Act for a Reason without Acting Intentionally?r a reason is performed intentionally. We develop and discuss here an apparent counterexample to this claim—a case in which people are inclined to say that an agent has performed a behavior for a reason, but are not inclined to say that he has performed that behavior intentionally.