书目名称 | Network Economics and the Allocation of Savings |
副标题 | A Model of Peering i |
编辑 | Philipp Servatius |
视频video | |
概述 | First analysis of the VoIP Telecommunications Market Network-based framework of interconnection savings.Innovative n-player model of interconnection, including long distance and termination fees.Conta |
丛书名称 | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems |
图书封面 |  |
描述 | This book provides a game theoretic model of interaction among VoIP telecommunications providers regarding their willingness to enter peering agreements with one another. The author shows that the incentive to peer is generally based on savings from otherwise payable long distance fees. At the same time, termination fees can have a countering and dominant effect, resulting in an environment in which VoIP firms decide against peering. Various scenarios of peering and rules for allocation of the savings are considered. The first part covers the relevant aspects of game theory and network theory, trying to give an overview of the concepts required in the subsequent application. The second part of the book introduces first a model of how the savings from peering can be calculated and then turns to the actual formation of peering relationships between VoIP firms. The conditions under which firms are willing to peer are then described, considering the possible influence of a regulatory body. |
出版日期 | Book 2012 |
关键词 | Game Theory; Interconnection; Network Theory; Peering; VoIP - Voice over Internet Protocol |
版次 | 1 |
doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21096-9 |
isbn_softcover | 978-3-642-21095-2 |
isbn_ebook | 978-3-642-21096-9Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957 |
issn_series | 0075-8442 |
copyright | Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 |