| 书目名称 | Modal Justification via Theories | | 编辑 | Bob Fischer | | 视频video | | | 概述 | Offers a new approach to modal epistemology.Identifies a new strategy for defending modal skepticism.Shows how modal epistemology can be naturalized | | 丛书名称 | Synthese Library | | 图书封面 |  | | 描述 | .This monograph articulates and defends a theory-based epistemology of modality (TEM). According to TEM, someone justifiably believe an interesting modal claim if and only if (a) she justifiably believes a theory according to which that claim is true, (b) she believes that claim on the basis of that theory, and (c) she has no defeaters for her belief in that claim. The book has two parts. In the first, the author motivates TEM, sets out the view in detail, and defends it against a number of objections. In the second, the author considers whether TEM is worth accepting. To argue that it is, the author sets out criteria for choosing between modal epistemologies, concluding that TEM has a number of important virtues. However, the author also concedes that TEM is cautious: it probably implies that we are not justified in believing some interesting modal claims that we might take ourselves to be justified in believing. This raises a question about TEM‘s relationship to Peter van Inwagen‘s modal skepticism, which the author explores in detail. As it turns out, TEM offers a better route to modal skepticism than the one that van Inwagen provides. But rather than being a liability, the auth | | 出版日期 | Book 2017 | | 关键词 | Modal Disagreement; Modal Epistemology; Modal Justification; Modal Knowledge; Modal Skepticism; Peter Van | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49127-1 | | isbn_softcover | 978-3-319-84089-5 | | isbn_ebook | 978-3-319-49127-1Series ISSN 0166-6991 Series E-ISSN 2542-8292 | | issn_series | 0166-6991 | | copyright | Springer International Publishing AG 2017 |
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发表于 2025-3-21 19:52:22
