Titlebook: Markets, Games, and Organizations; Essays in Honor of R Tatsuro Ichiishi,Thomas Marschak Book 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003 G

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Bargaining solutions with non-standard objectives,d that the notion of Nash Equilibrium reappears, in a sense to be explained. In the minimax-regret case I find (in contrast to the case of expected profit) a unique solution; this solution reduces, for priors with coincident support, to the linear equilibrium of Chatterjee-Samuelson. In the maximum-

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Coordination of economic activity: An example,f mechanism achieve efficient coordination, but the market mechanism has higher informational costs. The two cases are the same except in one respect. Therefore the different outcomes in the two cases cannot be due to properties that are the same in both cases.

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Survival and the art of profit maximization, under the equilibrium dynamics, the proportions of each group in the total population must be bounded away from zero, but the balance is in favor of the survival-probability maximizers in that their numbers as a fraction of total population must always exceed 1/2, and can be arbitrarily close to un

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Rose-Anne Dana regime. The book should pro­ vide readers with the most current status of the research activity in the general area of metal-semiconductor interfaces at an int978-1-4612-8086-6978-1-4613-0795-2Series ISSN 0258-1221

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Roy Radner and incentive theory,, a leading example of a non-market environment is the internal organization of a large corporation. Alfred Chandler (1977) made just this point when he gave his study of the modern American enterprise the title ..

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