Titlebook: Management Game Theory; Shaorong Sun,Na Sun Book 2018 China Economic Publishing House and Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018 Manageme

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Credible Commitment and Credible Threat in Games,edge disadvantageous to the other party. T. C. Schelling, the Nobel Prize winner in economics, defined commitment and threat as: A announces that B’s behaviour will lead to a response from A. If this response is a reward, then the announcement is a commitment; if this response is a penalty, then the

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Evolution and Stability,ead irrationality and sheep-flock effect, the analysis of individual rationality with game theory is often not in accord with reality. In fact, these non-rational individuals usually cannot correctly make a one-off, optimal choice in their game behaviour. Instead, through simple imitating and learni

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Evolution and Stability,non-rational individuals usually cannot correctly make a one-off, optimal choice in their game behaviour. Instead, through simple imitating and learning, they continuously adjust their own behaviour until it eventually reaches optimal utility. This is the evolutionary game.

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,Coalitions—Disintegration and Stability, can cause the coalition to break up, or cause cooperation within the coalition to become confrontational, leading to diminished payoffs, and in some situations can even lead to unstable game behaviour.

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