| 书目名称 | Lukács’s Phenomenology of Capitalism | | 副标题 | Reification Revalued | | 编辑 | Richard Westerman | | 视频video | http://file.papertrans.cn/590/589016/589016.mp4 | | 概述 | Offers one of the first full-scale accounts of Lukács’s Heidelberg Aesthetics in English..Reveals the links between Lukács’s account of society and his philosophy of art..Applies Lukács’s thought beyo | | 丛书名称 | Political Philosophy and Public Purpose | | 图书封面 |  | | 描述 | This book offers a radical new interpretation of Georg Lukács’s .History and Class Consciousness., showing for the first time how the philosophical framework for his analysis of society was laid in the drafts of a philosophy of art that he planned but never completed before he converted to Marxism. Reading Lukács’s work through the so-called “Heidelberg Aesthetics” reveals for the first time a range of unsuspected influences on his thought, such as Edmund Husserl, Emil Lask, and Alois Riegl; it also offers a theory of subjectivity within social relations that avoids many of the problems of earlier readings of his text. At a time when Lukács’s reputation is once more on the rise, this bold new reading helps revitalize his thought in ways that help it speak to contemporary concerns.. | | 出版日期 | Book 2019 | | 关键词 | Critical Theory; Western Marxism; Phenomenology; Social Theory; Radical Philosophy; History and Class Con | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93287-3 | | isbn_softcover | 978-3-030-06631-4 | | isbn_ebook | 978-3-319-93287-3Series ISSN 2524-714X Series E-ISSN 2524-7158 | | issn_series | 2524-714X | | copyright | The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerl |
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Front Matter |
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,Introduction: The Lukács Debate, |
Richard Westerman |
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Abstract
This chapter surveys the key points of the debate around Lukács. Westerman analyses a number of critical interpretations, most of which treat Lukács as a neo-Romantic or Idealist, and so assume that Lukács wrongly designates the proletariat as a subject somehow standing outside of social structures that it created and is capable of acting on. In contrast, more sympathetic readings, particularly those of Lucien Goldmann and Andrew Feenberg, read Lukács as treating subject and object as coequal. Westerman aligns his argument with such approaches: Lukács’s social theory should instead be read in the light of his engagement with Neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, and the formalist philosophy of art during his time in Heidelberg.
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Reality and Representation in Art |
Richard Westerman |
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Westerman argues that the basic conceptual framework of Lukács’s later Marxian social theory was first developed in his so-called Heidelberg Aesthetics—his drafts of a philosophy of art, written at Heidelberg between 1912 and 1918, but forgotten and only published after his death. This chapter offers the most detailed account of these manuscripts in English. It contextualizes Lukács’s argument within the reaction against psychologism, which included Hermann Lotze, Gottlob Frege, and Neo-Kantianism. Westerman identifies four significant sources of Lukács’s thought, who serve to represent these broader intellectual trends: art historians Alois Riegl and Konrad Fiedler, and philosophers Edmund Husserl and Emil Lask. Finally, the chapter outlines the aesthetics Lukács developed, focusing on the concepts of the standpoint and the totality, and on the relation between subject and object—all of which were of pivotal importance in his social theory, and which emerge here for the first time.
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The History of |
Richard Westerman |
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Tracing the development of Lukács’s thought from the heady days of revolution in 1919 to the publication of . in 1923, Westerman argues Lukács’s masterwork should not be seen as a single, relatively unified whole. The last-written essays of the book—‘What is Orthodox Marxism?,’ ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,’ and ‘Towards a Methodology of the Problem of Organisation’—are quite different from the earlier ones in their theoretical sophistication. Pointing to the references Lukács makes, to changes in his use of the term ‘consciousness,’ and to Lukács’s increasing tendency to use the term ‘totality’ to designate a self-enclosed whole, Westerman argues that these essays represent a theoretical return to his Heidelberg works. This justifies treating those works as a unified lens to interpret Lukács’s Marxian social theory.
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The Forms of Social Reality |
Richard Westerman |
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Westerman argues that Lukács interprets social being as an interlocking set of intentional practices, governed by an overarching formal logic. People and objects exist in society as complexes of meaning; their meaning is determined independently of their material existence, and is not the projection of a subject. Applying the model gleaned from Lukács’s Heidelberg drafts on art, Westerman identifies three levels of Lukács’s argument. Phenomenologically, individual objects are defined by intentional practices that govern the way subjects relate to them; the commodity, Lukács argues, is the site of a dichotomous intentionality. Second, these individual meanings are governed by a specific principle of validity that generates an ontic social reality, or way the world is understood as operating in the everyday lives of those within it. Third, this is founded on an ontological account of the way any objective reality appears as coherent from a particular subjective standpoint. Ontologically, therefore, social reality is a totality in which the relations between subject and object are determined by an asubjective logical form.
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The Interpellation of the Subject |
Richard Westerman |
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Challenging the claim the Lukács depends on a Fichtean expressive-creative subject in order to overcome reification, Westerman argues that Lukács’s subject is defined within the meaning-structures of consciousness. It is the subject-pole of social practice, interpellated as acting in certain ways by the objectively determined meaning of the commodity. Westerman offers a highly original reading of Lukács’s account of subjectivity by relating his account to Alois Riegl’s account of the subject-position revealed by formal analysis of works of art. Drawing on Riegl’s distinction between internal and external coherence, he distinguishes between social forms that exclude or incorporate spontaneous subjectivity within collective practices: reification is the result of the commodity form defining objects purely in relation to other objects, and excluding any subjective input whatsoever. In contrast, Lukács argues that a revolutionary Party must be formed on the basis of free participation by all its members—not led from above by an all-knowing leader. Westerman concludes by identifying Lukács’s Kierkegaardian argument that the structures of history can generate a moral imperative for revol
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Self-consciousness and Identity |
Richard Westerman |
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Westerman examines Lukács’s identification of the proletariat as the site of the overcoming of reification. While agreeing that his argument is not entirely convincing, Westerman argues that its failure is more interesting than normally assumed. First, Lukács suggests that reification produces a contradictory structure within individual consciousness that fragments the subject, leaving their lives increasingly empty. While his argument may not succeed entirely, it offers useful ways to think about how reification may be ruptured, and the seeming permanence of capitalism may be brought into question. Such fragmentation, however, is only negative—and may equally well generate reactionary responses as revolutionary ones, as shown by the recent rise of populism. Lukács suggests that an open, inclusive Party is the way to avoid this: it provides a fluid forum in which subjects may work together in generating a common identity.
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The Social and the Natural |
Richard Westerman |
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Lukács later rejected the theory he offered in . because of its failure to deal adequately with the existence of a material world outside social relations, and the way humans interact with this world. Andrew Feenberg identifies the same flaw in Lukács’s account, albeit with a quite different evaluation: this omission, he suggests, leads Lukács to ignore elements of domination and repression in our relation to the external world and our own natural drives. Westerman responds to these criticisms by drawing on Lukács’s suggestion that ‘nature’ is defined under capitalism in antinomic form: it is because nature is defined in part as ‘irrational’ that it is socially manifest as a formless substance to be appropriated by social relations. Westerman closes by arguing that Lukács’s theory offers new ways to think of our relations to nature that would be shorn of such elements of repression.
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Conclusion: Lukács in Late Capitalism |
Richard Westerman |
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In concluding, Westerman reconsiders the relative importance of the likes of Husserl, Lask, Riegl, and Fiedler with more conventionally understood sources of his thought, such as Hegel. He also offers suggestions as to how Lukács’s theory might be applied to understanding contemporary society, relating his argument to that of Fredric Jameson. Finally, he suggests that Lukács’s aestheticized interpretation of social forms offers a different way to think about rationality from the abstract, a priori version of Jürgen Habermasm offering new possibilities for Critical Social Theory.
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Back Matter |
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