| 书目名称 | Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information | | 副标题 | An Experimental Stud | | 编辑 | Wolfgang Ryll | | 视频video | | | 丛书名称 | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems | | 图书封面 |  | | 描述 | We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargaining leaves room for both parties to fare better when avoiding the conflict. We can distinguish between games which focus on strategic elements like games with incomplete information (see, for example, P‘ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989» and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973». The single-person decision theory approach to litigation assumes litigants to have a subjective estimate of the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the action. Differing views on the probability of winning the court case help to explain the fraction of cases that actually go to trial. Among others, P‘ng (1983) points out the shortcomings of the single-person decision theory approach which does not take into account, for example, the different fee systems in England and the U.S. and the differences in information conflicting par | | 出版日期 | Book 1996 | | 关键词 | Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung; Game Theory; Spieltheorie; economics; equilibrium; experimental econ | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61467-5 | | isbn_softcover | 978-3-540-61304-6 | | isbn_ebook | 978-3-642-61467-5Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957 | | issn_series | 0075-8442 | | copyright | Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996 |
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发表于 2025-3-21 18:19:06
