书目名称 | Justification and Knowledge | 副标题 | New Studies in Epist | 编辑 | George Sotiros Pappas | 视频video | | 丛书名称 | Philosophical Studies Series | 图书封面 |  | 描述 | With one exception, all of the papers in this volume were originally presented at a conference held in April, 1978, at The Ohio State University. The excep tion is the paper by Wilfrid Sellars, which is a revised version of a paper he originally published in the Journal of Philosophy, 1973. However, the present version of Sellars‘ paper is so thoroughly changed from its original, that it is now virtually a new paper. None of the other nine papers has been published previously. The bibliography, prepared by Nancy Kelsik, is very extensive and it is tempting to think that it is complete. But I believe that virtual com pleteness is more likely to prove correct. The conference was made possible by grants from the College of Human ities and the Graduate School, Ohio State University, as well as by a grant from the Philosophy Department. On behalf of the contributors, I want to thank these institutions for their support. I also want to thank Marshall Swain and Robert Turnbu~l for early help and encouragement; Bette Hellinger for assistance in setting up the confer ence; and Mary Raines and Virginia Foster for considerable aid in the pre paration of papers and many other conference m | 出版日期 | Book 1979 | 关键词 | bibliography; coherence; epistemology; issue; journal; knowledge; philosophy; present; realism | 版次 | 1 | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9493-5 | isbn_softcover | 978-90-277-1024-6 | isbn_ebook | 978-94-009-9493-5Series ISSN 0921-8599 Series E-ISSN 2542-8349 | issn_series | 0921-8599 | copyright | D. Riedel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1979 |
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Front Matter |
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Abstract
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,What is Justified Belief?, |
Alvin I. Goldman |
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of justified belief. What I have in mind is an explanatory theory, one that explains in a general way why certain beliefs are counted as justified and others as unjustified. Unlike some traditional approaches, I do not try to prescribe standards for justification that differ from, or improve upon, our ordinary standards. I merely try to explicate the ordinary standards, which are, I believe, quite different from those of many classical, e. g., ‘Cartesian’, accounts.
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,Justification and the Basis of Belief, |
Marshall Swain |
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Abstract
Whether a person, ., has knowledge that . depends upon the reasons for which . believes that .. The reasons for which a person believes something constitute that upon which the person’s belief is ... It often happens that a person’s belief that . is based upon a set of reasons . when believing that . on the basis of . is not justified for that person. This can happen even though the person has other reasons such that if the belief had been based upon those reasons, then the belief would have been justified. In such a case, . cannot be said to have knowledge. Consider, for example, Raquel and Laura, both of whom are tellers in a large bank, and both of whom are incredibly beautiful and vivacious. It is the stated policy of the bank that employees who are efficient and responsible can expect to be promoted after a sufficient time, and this policy has been carefully explained to Raquel and Laura. However, Raquel does not believe that decisions to promote are actually a function of efficiency and responsibility. Rather, she believes, quite irrationally, that the president of the bank is infatuated with her beauty and that she will be promoted because of this infatuation. Laura, on the
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,Basing Relations, |
Geogre S. Pappas |
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Abstract
Much of what a person knows at any time is based on evidence the person has, or perhaps has had. More generally, most of a person’s knowledge at any time is based on reasons that the person has or has had. But what is it for knowledge to be based on evidence or reasons? A complete answer to this question requires a full theory of inferential knowledge, something I will not try to provide here. Instead, I will examine three notions of basing, each of which, under some interpretation, seems necessary for knowing on the basis of evidence or reasons.
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,The Gettier Problem and the Analysis of Knowledge, |
Keith Lehrer |
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Abstract
The problem that Edmund Gettier formulated is, I believe, still unsolved.1 It has been explored and developed to such an extent that it is worthwhile stating just what the problem is. It is, in my opinion, the problem of showing that a falliblistic theory of epistemic justification is possible. For, the problem arises in certain cases in which a person is justified, whether he knows it or not, in believing or accepting some false proposition which transmits justification to some true proposition. Thus, for a Cartesian who held that epistemic justification must proceed from what is certain by certain steps to arrive at what is known, the problem would not arise. For a philosopher who avers, as I do, that epistemic justification is fallible, the problem is to articulate a theory of falliable epistemic justification which allows us to distinguish between those cases in which justification, though fallible, yields knowledge, and those in which some false proposition deprives one of obtaining knowledge from justification. I shall present an analysis of knowledge and theory of justification incorporating a fourth condition to solve the problem Gettier raised.
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,Epistemic Presupposition, |
Ernest Sosa |
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Abstract
What follows introduces and explains a concept of epistemic presupposition with the following features.
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,A Plethora of Epistemological Theories, |
John L. Pollock |
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Abstract
A perennial question of epistemology is, ‘Does knowledge have foundations?’ This question is almost as difficult to formulate precisely as it is to answer. Epistemological theories form a complex array, and as we will see, many of them are not happily classifiable as either foundations theories or non-foundations theories. The purpose of this paper will be to exhibit some of the structure of this array of epistemological theories, and to say something about which of these theories might be true.
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,The Directly Evident, |
Roderick M. Chisholm |
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Abstract
In the present paper, I shall correct and refine a theory of the directly evident which I have defended in a number of recent publications. The theory, I now believe, rests upon a mistaken general presupposition.
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,On Justifying Nonbasic Statements by Basic-Reports, |
James W. Cornman |
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Abstract
One of the crucial problems that faces a foundational theory of justification has been the difficulty of finding some plausible way to warrant inferences from what is foundational to other, nonfoundational statements. Without some such warrant only the very limited foundational statements are justified, and some form of epistemological skepticism seems reasonable. This latter is surely true if the foundation for each person is ‘Cartesian’, that is, consists only of what I call ‘basic-reports’ or first-person reports that concern only present psychological states of that person. This, of course, has traditionally been the foundation, whether for Descartes with a base of what is initially or noninferentially certain, or for C. I. Lewis who also seems to allow some statements that are merely initially acceptable, or for R. M. Chisholm who permits only the ‘directly evident’ at the foundation. It has, unfortunately, been the despair of ever finding a way to extend justification from such a narrow base that has caused many philosophers to flee to some non-foundational theory. But, if what I have argued elsewhere is correct, there is no haven from skepticism there.. Our only hope — slim
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,The Need for Epistemology: Problematic Realism Defended, |
Mark Pastin |
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Abstract
Epistemology, as I see it, is centrally concerned with the conditions under which statements (propositions, sentences, claims, whatever) are warranted — in a familiar, restricted sense of warranted; rationally as opposed to ethically, aesthetically, legally or otherwise warranted — for a person, and with the concept of warrant. This outlook presupposes that understanding of warrant conditions and of the concept of warrant are essential to understanding the nature of knowledge, which is the defining topic for epistemology. (Note: Despite this, I hold that warrant or justification is not necessary for knowledge..) The other concepts requisite to understanding knowledge, e. g., the concepts of belief, truth, or process of inference, are properly investigated by metaphysics and philosophical psychology. This concern with warrant has recently been challenged. One thrust is that with fuller understanding of the semantic, syntactic, and perhaps psychological character of statements, there will be no interesting residue of issues to be explored in terms of a concept of epistemic warrant. A second thrust is that the Gettier problem, and problems arising from the operation of social factors
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,More on Givenness and Explanatory Coherence, |
Wilfried Sellars |
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Abstract
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Back Matter |
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Abstract
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