Titlebook: International Economics; Bo Södersten,Geoffrey Reed Textbook 1994Latest edition Bo Södersten 1970, 1980; Bo Södersten and Geoffrey Reed 19

ABYSS

Trade Policy and Imperfect Competitione of tariffs as a means of correcting for these distortions. Our general conclusion was that tariffs might still reduce welfare still further, and that even in the cases where tariffs can increase welfare, they are necessarily inferior to other forms of policy intervention. Except in the particular

来就得意

Essential

The Political Economy of Protectiontrade and non-interference in domestic markets is the best policy for a government to follow if it wishes to achieve the highest possible level of potential welfare, except in the special case of the optimum tariff for a large country (and then only in the absence of retaliation).

GLIB

The Theory of Customs Unionsin the form of customs unions. This development naturally aroused the attention of trade theorists. Standard trade theory had only been concerned with the effects of non-discriminatory tariff changes, the type of tariff theory we have studied in Chapters 10, 11 and 12. But customs unions are by defi

绑架

Bo Södersten 1970, 1980; Bo Södersten and Geoffrey Reed 1994

哥哥喷涌而出

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23320-5exchange rates; foreign trade; international economics; trade policy

宪法没有

或者发神韵

The General Equilibrium Analysis of Trade Policypolicy instruments that we met in Chapter 10. There is however an important result — the Lerner Symmetry Theorem — which allows us to extend the results we shall obtain for tariffs to other price-based instruments. We shall discuss this theorem at the end of the chapter.

取之不竭

Trade Policy and Distortions in Domestic Marketsve conditions then in general the use of trade policy will reduce welfare. The only exception is the use of an appropriate tariff (or export tax) when the country is large enough to affect the prices at which it trades with the rest of the world.

Outshine

The Political Economy of Protectiontrade and non-interference in domestic markets is the best policy for a government to follow if it wishes to achieve the highest possible level of potential welfare, except in the special case of the optimum tariff for a large country (and then only in the absence of retaliation).